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"Elections, as yet, are simply struggles
for power. What we have gained is only a
count instead of a battle, but the code of
elections is yet the code of war, in which the
means are not fastidiously chosen, if they only
lead to success; in which the law of retaliation
is the only law which is thoroughly undisputed;
in which the only restraint is the sense of
honor and decency of the parties; in which the
standards for right and wrong are changed from
moment to moment as the question is, "What is
right for us?" or "What is right for them?"--
To keep any one from voting who would vote for
us is the greatest outrage conceivable. To
imperil their victory is to correct a great
wrong and save the country. To imperil ours is
to commit the most monstrous fraud." 1
William Graham Sumner
^William Graham' Sumner, "The Theory and Practice of Elec-
tions", Collected Essays (New York: Henry Holt Company. l88E>).
pp. 117-TT8T
..
.
.
.
XCHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1. Problem :
An efficient and honest election system is fundamental to
representative government. The importance of a sound election
system cannot be overemphasized in government that depends on
the ballot box. Election statutes cover hundreds of pages in
the law books, but violations of the laws and flagrant varia-
tions of procedure generally go unnoticed until brought to
light in a contested election. The laws dealing with elections
are numerous and technical and are so ill-arranged that they
have never been all completely codified. ^ in order to see how
these election laws are enforced and to realize the practical
workings of our election system it is necessary to turn to a
study of contested elections.
When an election is contested it indicates that something
is wrong with our election system. It is necessary to study
the ills of our elections to determine what the reason is for
these election disputes. Too many people worship the democra-
tic theory and ideals without the slightest notions of how de-
mocratic controls should be enforced.
^Massachusetts General Laws (Tercentenary Edition) Relating
to Primaries, Caucuses and Elections 19^4-3
•
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The proof of any election system must be evidenced by its
actual operation and the merits must be judged chiefly by hon-
est and efficient administration. A study of contested elec-
tions is an attempt to see how effective the election laws are
that deal with election controls. Certainly if there is any
danger of democratic principles being "frittered away by bad
management" it is in a contested election. If we consider that
in our vast governmental system most citizens' participation in
government does not often go beyond the ballot; it, therefore,
becomes necessary that our election procedure scrupulously
safeguard this already limited participation in government.
For forms of government let fools contest.
That which is best administered is best. 3
These words of Pope do seem to apply particularly in the
situation of democratic elections because we have evidence .of
organized frauds and election schemes all over the commonwealth
and the entire country which are constantly being used to sub-
vert democratic expression. The administration of these laws
depends to a large degree upon the policies set by our state
legislature. It is for that reason the principles and prece-
dents established by the General Court in its own election
cases will be studied to see how the General Court interprets
its own laws and to see what general policies are determined
3Alexander Pope, Essay on Man
, line 303f.
..
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by them for election administration. Our election system can
be no better than the general policies and principles set by
the General Court and by the administrative behavior of the
local election officials. Yet elections are so commonplace
and basic to our democratic system that they are often taken
for granted and the practical workings of the elections gener-
ally overlooked.
It is interesting to note the conscientious study made
of election problems by Luther Stearns Cushing and his modest
dedication to his outstanding volume on parliamentary laws.
Cushing's ideal was to compile election case data which would
make for precedents which would result in a "code of rules that
effects of which may be accuracy, economy of time, order, uni-
formity, and impartiality. !-l-
There has been more of a need for some sort of election
jurisprudence since the early pioneering days of that eminent
authority. Some of the editors of these election cases have
felt the need to establish sound precedents by which contested
elections could be settled.
>
^Luther S. Cushing, Elements the Law and Practice of
Legislative Assemblies (Boston: Little Brown and Company,
18^6), Advertisement, p. XI.
^Edward Loring and Charles T. Russell, Election Cases in
Massachusetts -- 1853-1885 (Boston: Wright and Potter, 1886 )
,
Introduction, p. VII.
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This study will inquire how well the expectations of
these pioneers in the Commonwealth of election jurisprudence
have materialized under legislative justice in election cases.
In Massachusetts special considerations must be given to
the judicial interpretation given to election statutes by the
legislature since there is no centralized administrative auth-
ority to deal with election problems. The Commonwealth depends
chiefly upon a bulk of old legal statutes for its election
controls which are technical, difficult, and poorly arranged.
The election laws are as numerous as they are ineffective.
The bulk of the election burden falls on the Secretary of the
Commonwealth's office, and election problems are handled in
routine fashion along with many other functions which that
office has to perform. So it is to law itself that we must
turn to seek the protection of the ballot boxes. Since these
laws are obviously not dynamic or self-enforcing, a study of
legislative adjudication as a ’’court or last appeal must be
made" to determine what the relationship of lav/s to the elec-
tion officials are in fact.
Lawful and honest elections cannot be separated from the
practice of contested elections. If our method of judging dis-
puted elections is unsound in the final authority of "last
appeal, then a successful and efficient election system itself
is not thereby encouraged. As the English experience has proved.
.. .
.
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it is only too easy for an unsound legislative "court of last
appeal" in elections to encourage an unsound if not corrupt
election procedure. What the legislature decides in contest-
ed election cases is bound to set the mode of election pract-
ise in the Commonwealth. If the legislature is arbitrary,
informal, and inconsistent, it is only natural to expect that
this policy of "looseness" will be reflected by local election
officials who will also conduct the elections in a haphazard
fashion. If the legislature, however, insists upon strict
compliance with the election laws, the local officials must
respond in a like manner, but they will not be otherwise en-
couraged to conduct elections to the letter of the law unless
the General Court insists.
The thesis of this paper is that the legislature is not
best fitted to exercise its judicial function of adjudicating
its own election cases. The General Court's exercise of the
power is ineffectual chiefly because: 1. e policy forming is
its primary function and election power is neglected and treat-
ed in cursory manner. £. the nature of the cases involve legal
questions and requires judicious handling rather than the polit
cal pibint of view expressed by the representative assembly
which is more tolerant, inconsistent
,
and arbitrary. 3. The
"absolute" and "exclusive" nature of the power over elections
tend to be exploited by the legislature in a careless and less
responsible consideration of the election laws. The legislative
incapacity to act as judges of its own membership is to be prov-
ed by an examination of 4£4
of cases appear before the Civil War, this factor does not detract
from the purpose of this oaoer which is to probe the methods of
*r
-
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7legislative adjudication of its own elections from 1780 to
1942 •
One of the problems which is inseparable from the main
theme of how well the legislature hasexercised its power, is
of course, the problem of how this power originated in the
first place. This problem is treated in Chapter II which
deals with the historical background of the power in question.
Chapter II suggests that the original purpose of this power
was to protect the weak legislature from encroachment by the
executive branch and that the conditions which gave rise to
the need for this power no longer exists aad as a result the
legislature does not attach as much importance to the power
as it formerly did. This is discussed in Chapter III which
also describes the present constitutional status of this
power.
The decline in the use of its power in more recent times
is explained in Chapter IV which describes the nature and
frequency of cases before the General Court.
Chapter IV describes the problems that have confronted
the legislatures and Chapter V inquires into how well speci-
fic questions before the legislatures were dealt with. This
chapter reveals certain inconsistencies and contradictions
which infer that the legislature is not the best suited body
to settle the type of issues presented to it in the form of
election cases
<*
*
*
A study of the early cases in Chapter VI reveals that the
General Court does not always follow a set mode of procedure
for hearing election cases and that even the form of petition
or the rules of evidence used by the legislature may vary.
This chapter makes it evident that the legislature has not
exercised its power prudently even in establishing a method
of hearing cases.
Chapter VII shows the methods of interpreting the law
by the General Court with its power of "last appeal" in
election oases. This chapter deals with the general attitudes
of the legislature in regard to election laws as indicated by
the use of its power over elections which is "absolute" and
are free from interference from the courts, since the decisions
6
of the legislature in election cases are final.
To sum up, the primary concern of this paper is how well
the legislature has exercised its power over elections. Chap-
ter II shows how the power originated and how it has declined
in importance. Chapter III indicates that the power over
elections by the legislature cannot be delegated under the
present rule of law in Massachusetts even though there has
been a growing dissatisfaction with the manner in which this
power has been exoercised. Chapter IV describes the nature
of the problems which confront the legislature in the handl-
^Dinan vs. Swig, 1916, 223 Mass. 516.
'•
J
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ing of election oases. Chapter V investigates into how well
the specifio problems before that body have been decided.
Chapter VI describes from early ca^es the type of orocedure
followed by the General Court in hearing cases before it and
discloses the type of procedure employed under this power.
Chapter VII presents the legislative attitude toward election
laws in the exercise of its power. How the General Court has
applied its power over its own elections remains for this
paper to answer,
2, Methods
The present writer recognizes that it is much easier to
find fault than to find a remedy, and yet finding fault in
this particular problem appears to be the essential prere-
quisite to any remedy. It is for that reason that a study of
ailments of the election system is made as seen through these
cont est^election cases. These cases highlight some of the
fundamental problems that underlie the election system in the
Commonwealth. The problem, therefore, has the two-fold pur-
pose of observing the methods of legislative adjudication
and relating it to the problem of election administration in
the Commonwealth. Specific considerations will be given to
trends from 1780-1942 involving the basic electioh principles
Observations will be made concerning the consistency of the
legislature, $5 well as the possible desirability of another
method of deciding contested elections other than legislative
T ' >
•
,
•
:
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adjudication.
The first method employed in this study was the histori-
cal and comparative approach to determine what the origin of
the system of legislative adjudication of elections was. The
conditions which gave rise to this system in England and how
it was handed down to our present government is a necessary
introduction to the problem. A brief historical survey con-
cerning some of the opinions of the present system was uti-
lized in order to give the problem perspective.
The case method was used so that the type of decisions
rendered by the legislature in contested election cases
oould be examined. The mode of procedure of handling elec-
tion cases and precedents established was observed by this
method
.
A statistical method was used to determine the various
reasons for which elections have been contested. Other perti-
nent data such as the number of times members have been un-
seated and the number of times the election committee reports
have been overruled by full vote of the legislature, was noted.
In order to facilitate the study of some four hundred and
twenty-four election cases in the Commonwealth since 1780,
tabulations have been made on charts divided into twenty year
periods. Statistical charts indicate general trends which
have significance to the problem since the main principles
involved in these cases have also been listed.
,'vWO £
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The reasons for contesting elections have been classi-
7
fied under four main headings: 1* Procedure of the Election
r
officials; Z* Qualifications of Office Holder; 3. Qualifi
cation of Voters, and 4. The Count of votes. These general
divisions have been further classified into sub-headings so
as to determine the causes of contested elections more speci-
fically. This data has been numerically computed and graphi-
cally illustrated in the appendix of this study.
*
3. Scope
:
,
,
The scope of this sturfy to contested or contro-
verted elections in Massachusetts before the G-eneral Court
from 1780-1942 inclusive. This study is based on the publish-
ed legislative reports, and the scope of this study coincides
' with the same dates treated in the reports which include 1780
o
through 1942* The year 1942 is included in this study since
it is included in the published reports although no cases are
reported for that year. The Fitzgerald case in 1947 was the
' 9
only noteable case since 1942 and this case is referred to »>x-+Utext
but not included in the statistical data.
Contested elections have taken place in Massachusetts
s^nce 1644^but only the cases from 1780 will be considered
because they are reported by the legislature operative under
Injra , Chapter IV, Section I.
^In|ra, Bibliography, Case Books. F. 126.
91Tbse#feld vs A Fitzgerald 1947, Journal of the House
lORobert Luce, Legislative Assemblies (Boston; Houghton
Company, 1924) p . 196.
V v.r
t
the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 1780
Since such a vast majority of these cases take place before
1861, it is to be expected that many references will be made
to old cases. However, these old ca^es are important since
they have set precedents which have molded a general pattern
for the General Court in dealing with election cases.
Authorities on election laws and on parliamentary proce-
dure, such as Luther S. Cushing, Thomas M. Cooley, and George
W. MoCrary, have been cited in order to give their views on
' certain questions. This is necessary since the General Court
itself often cites these jurists for precedent in election
cases. The works of these three men do not necessarily apply
specifically to Massachusetts since they were intended as treat
iees on election jurisprudence and are cited as precedent by
election committees to apply in Massachusetts.
Quo Warranto and mandamus procedures will not be consider-
ed because the chief concern of this paper is to examine the
manner by which the legislature has settled election cases
before it. This paper does not claim to be a current legal
treatise of election laws since its primary purpose is to see
how well cases have been decided in the past, and to consider
some of the precedents established by the legislature.
L De^i pihiori of Texms:
Massachusetts does not follow the English pattern in
matters of definition. For example, there is no distinction
made between "election” and "return" in the Commonwealth.
««
r
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These are merely considered together. 11 In a similar fashion
the words ’’contested" and ’’controverted” elections are used
eynonomously
,
although technically a "contested” election is
12
a test of the validity questioned by the House. However, for
our purposes the two words are used interchangeably since this
line of difference is not drawn by the General Court itself.
The English are much more specific and exacting in their def-
initions of all these terms. For example, a ’’contested" elec-
tion to the English is a technical definition and is used when-
ever more than one candidate has been nominated for the same
office, The terms "disputed” or "controverted” are used by the
English to express what we mean when we use the loose term
13
"contested”. This looseness of definition is more or less re-
flected in the manner in which other definitions are applied
such as "directory” laws or "mandatory" laws. Perhaps even more
significant is the manner in which all cases of whether the
member was returned by a mistake, or whether fraud was involved
or whether the corporate rights of the town and the legal
rights of the voter have been violated, or whether the case is
just a matter of inimical or repugnant charaoter--are all con-
sidered alike. They are all contested elections but virtue of
this general definition of the term. All these cases are an
attempt to see the merits of legislative adjudication as it
applies to the election process in action.
11
Cushing, op. cit. p. 70.
12Ibid,
.
p. TV.
13Edward M. Sait, "Contested Elections, "
Social Science
.
Vol )8.
Encylopedia of
rc
r
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CHAPTER II
ORIGIN OR THE POWER
1 . In England ;
The origin of the legislative power over its elections is
presented to show how a once important power has become neglect
ed and abused after the conditions which gave rise to it no
longer existed. The practice of allowing a legislative assembly
to decide election disputes of its own body started in the six-
teenth century when Mary Tudor allowed a committee of Parlia-
ment to inquire into the election of Alexander Nowell, in 1586.
The Power to settle the validity of the election of its own mem-
bers was a right which had been previously exercised by the
chancery, or in council. Until this period the seats in ParliaJI-
ment were not prized enough to make this a very important issue.
However, as the House of Commons quietly gained more power, and
as the struggle between the Crown and Commons became sharper,
the cower to judge the elections and qualifications of its own
members was used more and more by Commons to guard against
royal abuses of their body.
Elizabeth had to resort to "packing" the House by creating
new boroughs which gave her sixty-two favorable members to hell
her keep Commons in check. During Elizabeth's reign the election
Robert Luce, Legislative Assemblies (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1924
,
)”d7"T9'2
o
George Lunt, History of Eng land (New York: Haroer and
Bros., 1947.) b. 584.
c.
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returns were again decided by the chancery despite the prece-
dent established under Mary which gave this power to Parliament,
As yet. Parliament was not secure enough to use this privilege
against the Crown, but as a steadily increased indignation was
growing against the Crown, Parliament utilized every opportunity
“to boldly carry out!' demands for this privilege in a decisive
struggle. When Elizabeth ordered Mr, Strickland "to never more
appear” (sic) in Parliament, Commons remained firm upon this
privilege, Elizabeth tactfully withdrew these orders with the
apology that she "did not mean to prejudice any part of the
liberties heretofore granted them. "3
The House of Commons again seized the opportunity to exer-
cise this privilege when the unpopular James I threatened the
independence of the House by arrogantly flaunting his theory of
"divine right" in its face. When the chancery declared Goodwin
an outlaw, denied him his seat, and seated instead the privy
councilor, Portescue, Commons immediately protested that this
action violated the right of Parliament to be its own judge of
the election and qualifications of its own members.^- In the
dispute that followed, James made an issue of his "divine rights
theory, but under pressure had to admit that the House did have
the right to determine the elections of its own members. £ In
3John Richard Green, A Short History of the English People
(New York: Harper Bros., 1899)
, p. 5.02.
^-Lunt, Op Cit
.^ p. 388 .
^Green, or
.
Cit p. I4.87 .
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. .
order to preserve the sanctity of his theory of "divine right"
James personally requested that his candidate, Fortescue, he
allowed a seat. Commons granted this request but gained in
return a recognition of the principle that they were to be the
judges of their own elections.
The Stuarts became notoriously unpopular so that the initi-
ative was taken by the House of Commons, and they were prepared
to maintain constitutional liberties against the King. So im-
portant were the issues involved in the power of the house to be
the sole judge of its own members, that this period saw the
most able statesmen of English history serving on election com-
mittees which included such names as Pym, Sir Francis Bacon,
Selden, and Sir Edward Coke. 1^ Truly, this struggle for parlia-
mentary privileges in the struggle between the Commons and the
Crown was the most crucial issue of the day, and it asserted
the freedom of parliaments from the "divine right to rule"
theory during the most important stages. In fact, it might be
safely asserted that the famous Goodwin and Fortescue election
marked the zenith of the right of parliament to be the sole
judge of its own members. This attempt by James to deny this
right to parliament was the last significant attempt in England
to dispute the fact that the House of Commons had exclusive
jurisdiction over its own election.
^
!b
^Sir William Anson, The Law and Custom of the Constitution
P . 179.
— —
7Henry Hallam, Constitutional History of England p. 299.
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However, since those famous struggles between the Crown
and Commons had faded out of importance in English minds, this
method of the full parliament sitting as judges in their own
election cases has undergone an interesting transition. Al-
though Commons regarded it as "antient ( sic ) and natural un-
doubted privilege and power" to examine the validity of their
own elections and returns, there were many practical difficul-
ties that made the full body sitting in on election cases
unfeasible
.
The popular agitation during Wilkes' election awakened in
the nation a growing awareness of the corruption and despotism
O
of the House of Commons. Reforms were introduced to remedy
the abuses by commons of its privilege. George Grenville in-
troduced the reform to delegate the power of election adjudica-
tion to a committee of Parliament.? Many were "thin to hear
but full to judge" and the privilege of judging its own members
was no longer used to protect the integrity of Parliament, since
it was abused for political expediency,
Sir Robert Peel introduced a smaller committee composed
along party lines but the parliamentary tribunals continued to
o
°Green, op cit
., p. 775*
o
'Luther S. Cushing, Elements of the Law and Practice of
Legislative Assemblies in~The U, S, of America (New York: LittJe
3rown Publishing Co., l8£6)
,
p.
10S ir Thomas May, Constitutional History of England (Erg-
land, 1912), pp. 2 291-29^.
..
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prove themselves unsatisfactory. To avoid political abuses
and election scandals and for more equitable settlement of
election disputes, the English transferred this power to the
courts in 1868. Thus, when this privilege, which was so essen-
tial in gaining recognition of the rights of early Parliaments
later outgrew its usefulness and became a political humbug, it
was transferred to a body who could more expertly and efficient-
ly handle election problems. This change was made in the Brit-
ish system without a single indignity to the freedom of parli-
aments •^ Aft er the conditions which gave rise to legislative con-
trol over elections no longer existed, the cower became neglected
and abased by legislative assemblies themselves.
2 . In the Commonwealth :
Now, if we turn back to the history of our own state legis-
lature there is an interesting parallel of events. When our
colonists found themselves inexperienced in the art of govern-
ment and with a large degree of self-governing powers in the
early period, it seemed only natural that they should turn to
"Mother" England for the details of government. The colonists
did just that, and the colonists also assumed the same rights
and privileges for their assemblies that the House of Commons
enjoyed. 1 ^ This privilege of judging elections°\ts own body
was guarded in Massachusetts for the same reasons that it was in
^Luce, op cit
. p. 197.
12C. H. Rammelkamp, Contested Congressional Elections ;
Political Science Quarterly
.
XX. (September, 1905>) P* 1+21 .
13lbid, pp. I|23-ii37.
.i t •
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England, which was owing to a constant struggle between the
royal governors and the colonial legislatures. Legislative
adjudication found expression in Massachusetts as early as
1634 :
That when the deputyes of severall townes are
mett togeather before any Generali Court, it
shalbe lawfull for them or the major parte of
them, to heare & determine any difference that
may arise about the election of any of their
members .14
This power was exercised by the General Court as early as
l6I|lj- in the Steevens case from the town of "Gloster" when Bruin
was ordered "bee sent home agayne, and that ye towne of Gloster
is desired to send ye said Mr. Steevens."^
Expressions of the right of the legislature to judge their
own members are also present in the Provinicial Charter of 1692
"The representatives assembled in any great
and general court shall be the sole judges
of the elections and qualifications of their
own members . "16
The conflicts of the Bay Colony with England, came to a
climax with the withdrawal of the Colonial Charter and with
the royal administration of Sir Edmond Andros. The struggle
that ensued between Andros and the assemblies of the
^Records of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay in New Eng-
land, Vol. I, p. llj.2.
^IMd, III, p. 3.
^Edward Everett Kale, The Story of Massachusetts (Boston;
Lothrop, 1891), pp. 167 -173 .
4;3 r' ^nol:
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Massachusetts Province is reminiscent of the parliamentary
struggle with James I. The assemblies had to guard their pri-
vileges of election powers in order to prevent themselves from
becoming little more than "packed” assemblies to register the
decrees of the royal governor. During the colonial period,
elections seemed to have run so smoothly that there was little
cause for this privilege to be exploited to any considerable
degree. However, with the revolution against England and the
organization of a new constitution in 1780, this ancient pri-
vilege again received expression in the constitution:
The House of Representatives shall be the
judge of the returns, elections, and qual-
ifications of its own members. The Senate
shall have the same powers in the like
cases
.
17
The rise of practical politics in the early days saw many
elections being contested from 1780 to the present. It is that
system of legislative adjudication of elections which was adopt-
ed from England that we propose to examine in this paper.
Although the English discarded this system long ago, there have
been few changes in our present system as originated by the
English.
^Constitution of Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Chapter I
Sec. iii; Article X and XI.
..
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CHAPTER III
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OP THE POWER
1. Argu~ nents .Advanced by the Apologists of the System:
The historical development of legislative adjudication has
been briefly outlined to indicate what the origin of the system
was, and why it became important in England and in colonial
times in Massachusetts. The conditions which warranted the
rise of this power of legislative adjudication of the elec-
tions of its own members, were weak legislatures confronted by
executive encroachments and controlled membership. ^ With the
rise of strong legislative and judicial branches of government,
this means of protecting the integrity of the legislatures was
no longer necessary.
The conditions changed considerably. In England, the
power was delegated to a tribunal because it saved the time of
parliament and provided for more equitable settlement of elec-
tion disputes. It resulted in the adoption of a more sound
election administration in England. England made this change
without any danger of encroachment by the Crown on parliament-
ary privileges. The change made for a great improvement in
election jurisprudence in England.
^
1 Supra
,
Chapter II
.
^Edward McChesney Sait, "Contested Elections," Encyclopedia
of Social Science, Vol. IV, p. 308. The French have a local
election system to the local assemblies, which is laid down by
statute with administrative courts to settle all disputes. This
system works out more according to the principles of justice.
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The English made this change when they felt that the orig-
inal need not only no longer existed, but that this privilege
was being abused by political expediency within parliament it-
self. They abandoned the system, since they recognized a more
judicial method would better insure the integrity and prestige
of their body. When contested elections became a political hum-
bug, they sought and investigated to find a method that better
fitted the needs. Yet none of the parliament's freedom was
infringed upon by this change to a judicial tribunal. It has
been claimed that this cha/nge was saved from its own political
frail^ties by the "rule of law."
It is interesting to observe that while the innovator of
legislative adjudication of election has abandoned the system
without ill effects, the American imitators of the system are'
loathe to do so. Massachusetts lawyers have come to regard
this ancient privilege as a basic power to all free legislative
assemblies. Foremost among those who have regarded this power
with abundant caution is the eminent Massachusetts lawyer and
compiler of election cases, Luther Stearns Cushing. Cushing
holds that the power is fundamental to our concept of free
assembly.' Cushing states that:
This power is so essential to the free elec-
tion and independent existence of a legisla-
tive assembly, that it may be regarded a nec-
essary incident to every body of that descrip-
tion.
3
^Luther S. Cushing, Elements of Law and Practice of Legis -
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Judge Thomas M. Cooley points out the importance of this
"high function” with the traditional point of view that a leg-
islature is not a free legislature unless it has the full power
to judge its own election of members. Cooley states this func-
tion is necessary to the safety of the state and so important
that:
It exists whether expressly conferred or
not. It is a necessary and incidental
power... and the courts cannot inquire
into the justice of the decision. 4-
The views of Cushing and Cooley are typical of those who
still stress the need of the legislative assemblies to protect
themselves. The expression that it was an absolute power above
the power of the courts and essential to free assemblies, how-
ever, has diminished. It has become less tenable since legisla-
tive supremacy over the executive branch has long been the cus-
tom in the Commonwealth.
Very few still fear grave encroachment on the legislative
powers. There have been examples where other free legislative
assemblies have established other methods of adjudicating elec-
tions without infringement of legislative powers and with marker
improvements
.
Among those who deplore the present system of legislative
adjudication of elections and think that the present method is
Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limita -
tions (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., l'86tf), p. 133.
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inadequate is former Speaker of the House, Thomas Heed. Heed
does not believe the importance of this power to be absolute-
ly essential in the present governmental structure. Reed ob-
served that the power was lodged with the legislators in earlier
days because there was no other place for such a power. Reed
holds that the power is obsolete, but it would be impossible to
change Or delegate this traditional power without a constitu-
tional amendment:
We could not divest ourselves of our right to be
judges of elections, even if we would. Nor would
any statute enacted by both houses serve the pur-
pose.
5
Among those who feel that the change is needed and is pos-
sible without constitutional amendment, is Robert Luce, a for-
mer representative to the General Court for nine years and
strong proponent for improving the method of legislative adjudi-
cation. Luce cites the example of Pennsylvania where the deter-
mination of contested elections is made by the courts of law
with the result of an improved method for settling election
disputes. Luce states that if the courts shall determine who,
prima facie t have been elected, then this would not deprive the
legislative of the right nor interfere with the duty of final
determination as to election. It would make for more judicious
handling of these important cases.
^
^Thomas Reed, "Contested Elections," North America Review
(July 1890), pp. 112-115.
p. ^uce, Congressional Record, Vol. 6l; Part 6, 1921,
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The views as to the importance of legislative control
over elections are varied. Some hold it to be an absolute pro-
tection of free assemblies and do not desire to have it alter-
ed. Others believe this power is antiquated and no longer
meets the present election needs but impossible to change with-
out a constitutional amendment. Still others attach less im-
portance to the power and insist that it may be delegated with-
out constitutional amendment to provide a method which can
better cope with election problems. Attention will now be
turned to the growing discontent of the present system.
2 . Growing Discontent :
Growing discontent of the judicial functions of the legis-
latures has become pronounced in recent years. The old judicia
powers of legislatures had become obsolete over a century ago.
The days when the legislature made frequent judicial decisions
on almost every question have passed. 7 A growing dissatisfac-
tion and fear of the legislative power, the doctrine of the
supremacy of the constitution as fundamental law, and the doct-
rine of a separation of powers gave rise to a new and stronger
judiciary. Legislative justice was succeeded by a judicial sup
remacy that made our judges "guardians of the constitution."
The dominant position of the legislatures of the colonial day
had to make way for the judiciary.®
7Vincent M. Barnett Jr., "Legislative Adjudication of Conte
Elections," Unpublished Harvard Dissertation, 1938, p. 27.
BHaines, o£. cit
.
,
pp. 202 -22^.
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Yet there are obvious traces of legislative justice still
operative. Although judicial acts of legislature ended in the
nineteenth century, there are important exceptions. The process
of impeachment, the handling of claims against the state, and
the adjudication over elections of their own body, are interes-
ting remnants. These functions alone are the chief judicial
functions of the legislature which present an outstanding ex-
ception to the doctrine of separation of powers.
Criticism of both the state and federal legislatures is
quite in keeping with the democratic traditions, and criticism^
of the power of legislative adjudication is no exception. Pro-
tests have varied from profound official statements and schol-
arly research to whimsical comments. For example, the common
belief that all contested elections are, ipso facto^
,
a matter
to be decided along political lines, is generally the most
popular criticism. The famous senator from Massachusetts,
George Frisbie Hoar, tells this story about Thaddeus Stevens
who arrived late at a committee meeting which was hearing an
election case:
Stevens asked, "What is the point in the
case?" "There is not much point to it"
replied a colleague, "they are both dam-
ned scoundrels." "Well, said Stevens,
"which is the Republican damned scoundrel?"
I want to go for the Republican damned
scoundrel. "9
^George Frisbie Hoar, Autobiography Cttew Y.rkxSc-fiUw WJto)
268. '
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The charge of partisanship is the most vocal one. The
statement of Henry Q. Dawes that elections cases "seldom find
listeners beyond the parties directly involved, or that the
"incoming of an election case is leave of absence for three
quarters of the house" shows the dislike for handling such
cases. When the witty George D. Robinson, representative in
the General Court and former Governor of Massachusetts, went to
Congress in 1877 was asked what were party questions, he said,
"I know of none except election cases."^
Although criticisms of partisanship are over-shadowed by
epigrams, the other more serious but less colorful views on the
merits of legislative adjudication have opened the issue for
serious consideration. Perhaps the fairest and most learned
treatise on federal contested elections was made by Vincent M.
Barnett. Barnett’s research of the last sixty contested elec-
tions decided by Congress that thirty-eight decisions favored
individuals in the minority party which would seem to refute
the chance of partisanship. However, Barnett says that a
statistical survey of partisanship is not an accurate indica-
tion of partisanship and that the cases themselves have to be
studied. Barnett feels that closed cases are more than likely
settled along party lines, and he points out other criticisms
^Henry L. Dawes, "The Mode of Procedure in cases of Con-
tested Elections," Journal of Social Science
. 1870, pp. £6-58.
1^-Luce, Legislative Assemblies
, op cit p. 203.
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of the system on both the national and state levels. He is not
more concerned with charges of partisanship than he is with the
gross inefficiency and defects of the legislature in dealing
with the cases. Therefore, he favors administrative handling
12
of such problems.
The method which the legislature uses to protect the purity
of election is thought by many to undermine the true meaning of
law. Among those opposing the “arbitrary" system employed by
the legislatures is the noted dean of law, Roscoe Pound, who
concludes:
"In sum, legislative justice is uncertain,
crude at its best and capricious at its
worst, cumbersome and expensive, with no
corresponding advantage. "13
Representative Ballinger has made several attempts to
alter the federal system. Ballinger describes the defects of
the present system as "peculiarly subject to partisans," and
states that the legislature has "no special qualifications to
decide judicial questions" and t hat the system "encourages fri-
volous contests."^
The notion that legislative adjudication does not solve
legislative deficiencies in administration has been strong.
Biscontent with the present system has been expressed by some
•^Barnett, “Legislative Adjudication of Contested Elections^
op cit
.
,
p. 1I4.9 .
^Roscoe Pound, "Justice According to Law," 13 Columbia
Law Review
.
69k' li|. Bee ember, 1913.
p ^ffij
^ongressional fts.c.ord, February 12, 1925, Vol. 66, Part 1+,
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of the election committees themselves. Many election reform
groups and civic societies have been clamoring for improvements
of legislative adjudication. Among the early leading groups
was the Election Laws League of Massachusetts which protested
that although an abundance of election lawa existed, they were
not effective. This group wanted to remedy the lack of proper
enforcement of election laws by resorting to legislative justice
for election cases "only when other remedial measures are found
inadequate . "
^
The feeling is growing that state legislatures were not
providing the function of forming clear election policies so
that the election laws could properly be executed. Many have
appealed to state legislatures to urge them to cooperate with
other branches of government for the sake of administrative
efficiency. It has been charged that our governmental system
is out of balance because of the strain put upon the policy-
forming branch of government. In order to make for a higher
level of performance an existing implicit policy must be clearly
stated. The state legislature has failed to form clear election
policy because it has attempted to do too much, and it has often
sacrificed long run considerations to immediate, local, or per-
sonal advantage. The formation of clear election policy is the
l^Edwin L. Sprague, The Election Laws League of Massachus -
etts t Annual Report of the President, February 1, 190lJ~
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first important task of the legislature. Considerations of
the type of election policies revealed in the study. of elec-
tion cases will be discussed in another section. ° It will be
sufficient to state here that the legislative failure to make
a clear statement of election policy has hampered a higher
level of carrying out the policy by the executive branch.
Leonard White, formerly with the United States Civil Service
i
Commission and now professor of Public Administration, believes
that better administration cannot be effected until "equally
r
substantial improvements in the art of legislation are made. "17
\
The need for better election administration was recogni-
zed by some of the election committees themselves. Observing
that the General Court can do only so much in one session,
some have frankly admitted the need for administrative action
to relieve the house of the burden of adjudication in election
cases. Such an admission was emphatically stated in the min-
ority report in the case of Cahill vs. Moyse before the Senate
of the General Court in 1935.^ The committee of elections
gave as a reason for general failure of election officials to
comply with the statutes governing elections, that the
separate towns have long been in control of one political
l6Xtlfra, Chapter V.
17
'Leonard White, New Horizons in Public Administration
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1945), Part I.
"1
°Senate Journal, February 18, 1935, p. 270.
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group. The single dominant parties have generally been in
office so long that they tend to disregard the protests of
those voters not within their party. Thus elections are admin-
istered according to the ideas and policies of these officials
without qualms of conscience or fear of punishment for enfringe-
ment of the statutes of the Commonwealth. The committee states
that it is not ignorance of the law on the part of local elec-
tion officials but disrespect for the law. The actions of
local election officials are supposed to be governed by the
election policies determined by the General Court. YYhenever
the General Court fails to clearly determine an election policy,
the result is a recurrence of utter disrespect and disregard
for the law by the local officials. The committee contained a
recommendation that:
"The time has come in our Commonwealth
when there should be some direction
and controlling force to oversee the
actions of our election officials."^
It may be concluded that a system of legislative adjudica-
tion is not satisfactory to many within the Commonwealth. Many
state that part of the difficulty of sound election administra-
tion lies in this system of legislative justice. But, so far,
attempts to set up a single administrative authority to cope
with elections have failed) since it has been held unconstitution-
al for the General Court to divest itself of this power.
^Loc. cit
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Nevertheless, appeals for administrative reform are still en-
thusiastically made. They are even found among legislative
committees. The Dinan vs. Swig^O decision of 1916 that this
power is a "sole and exclusive power of which the legislature
cannot divest itself,” is where the matter rests at present.
Despite the attempts to change the present system, this decision
under the separation of powers clause of the Constitution has
thus far voided any attempts. Since the separation of powers
theory is the seeming obstacle to a change, consideration will
be given as to how this theory applies to legislative adjudica-
tion in Massachusetts.
20Dinan vs. Swig, 1916. 223 Mass. £l6.
21Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Part
I, Section III, Cf. post section 3.
r >
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3 . Application to Separation of Powers in Massachusetts :
The concept of a separation of powers is as old as polit-
ical theory itself . 1 Locke gave a definite form to the theory
in an attempt to generalize the results of the struggle of the
English parliament with the Grown. The theory served to give
"harmonious balance between those who made the law and those who
execute" in the changing pattern of governmental institutions.
Therefore, this theory served a practical need and was given by
MontesquieV 1* works the "halo of general and eternal truth.
Although Montesquieu's definition of the theory was not
too clear, it did not imply the strict absolute doctrine which
later generations attached to it Montesquieu did not really
contemplate absolute separation of the three powers. This
doctrine was recognized by some of the founding fathers as not
an absolute doctrine, but rather a doctrine which had great
latitude in a work-a-day government.^- Madison pointed out that
a separation of powers meant that the entire functions could
not be exercised by one branch in a free government but that a
"partial mixture of powers" had been admitted in the national
and state constitutions.
^"George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory
, p. 559*
^Carl J. Friedrich. Constitutional Government and Democracy.
p. 172 .
' '
•3
•^Sabine, ojd. cit .
?
p. £60.
^-James Madison, The Federalist No. XLVTI (3oston: Kallowell
edition, I8I4.2 ), p. 22WI
.•
*
-
'
.
.
.
- - .
.
•
.
.
* »
The purpose of the doctrine was to keep a relationship
among the departments of government that would keep the govern-
ment free. The theory fitted the need of the American Colonists
who had freed themselves from England then ruled by legislative
supremacy. ^ There developed a growing distrust of the legisla-
tures of that period. The judiciary was increased in function
to offset the legislative power. Massachusetts was among the
first to give formal expression of the theory of a separation
of powers inher constitution of 1780.^ The constitution pro-
vides that:
the legislative department shall never exer-
cise the executive and judicial powers, or
either of them: The executive shall never
exercise the legislative, or either of them:
The judicial shall never exercise the legis-
lative and executive powers, or either of
them: To the end it may be a government of
laws and not of men .
7'
~
The expression of a separation of powers in the constitu-
tion of the Commonwealth was not intended to be "absolute.” It
was intended to protect the Commonwealth against a government
"of men'* a partial mixture of power was recognized as essential
to meet the need for balance in modern government which could
^Charles Grove Haines, The American Doctrine of Judicial
Supremacy (Berkley: University of California Press, 1932T»
pi 20?.
£
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Part 1,
Section XXX.
7Loc
.
Cit . Italics my own.
A*
*
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not be entirely classified un<tev three separate rukri.cs. 8 That
governmental functions cannot be absolutely classified into
/
three strict headings of executive, judicial, and legislative
o
has been generally recognized. Exceptions have to be made in
order to counteract the inadequacies of placing all governmental
processes under three rubies. However, many still feel that the
doctrine of the separation of powers is absolute. The courts
have generally ruled cases by a strict interpretation of the
doctrine . 10
Separation of powers theory has had an interesting applica-
tion by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, indicating
how closely associated legislative adjudication of elections
is to the theory of a separation of powers. A corrupt practice
act^ which delegated election responsibility to the courts in
a limited degree, gave power to three Superior Court justices
(upon petition of five) to investigate corrupt practices in the
election. If they found that the law had been violated, they
®James Landis, Administrative Process (New York: F. S.
Crofts and Co. I 9I+0 ) 7 p. Zp7
.
^Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy
(Boston: Little Brown Company
,
1 9I4.I ) t e t
"
pass .1 m
,
0 hapter X.
lowestel Willoughby, Principles of Constitutional Law of the
United States (I92 I4.), p. 6o2
.
^Statute of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, l 01 J|
,
Chapter 7^3, Section 10.
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could enter a decree "declaring void the election of the defen-
dant to the office in question." However, in dealing with
elections to the General Courts, the act provided that rather
S b
than declaring those legislative elections void in such cases,
that the justices were merely to enter a decree declaring cor-
rupt practices was committed and to transmit forth the facts
and relative findings to the Secretary of the Commonwealth who
was to turn over the findings to the presiding officer of the
legislature body to which the defendant was elected.-^ This was
a mild election reform to attempt more efficient prevention of
election abuses. The act was carefully worded so as not to seam
to deprive the legislature of its power over election cases.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts declared this act to
be a violation of the constitution of the Commonwealth. The
act was declared unconstitutional April 6, 1916. The opinion
in the Dinan vs. Swig case^-3 was rendered by Chief Justice Rugg
who reasoned that no other branch of government could adjudicate
upon legislative elections since this power invested exclusively
in each branch of the General Court." Chief Justice Rugg con-
tinued his opinion in no uncertain terms:
The grant of power is comprehensive, full
and complete. It is necessarily exclusive.
12 Loc. Cit.
1 3pjnan vs. Swig lpl6, 223 Mass. 5l6.
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for the Constitution contains no words
permitting either branch of the Legisla-
ture to delegate or share that power...
which each house alone can exercise. 1^
Chief Justice Rugg would not allow "the grant of absolute
power to be frittered" away as it was not "susceptible of being
deputed". The reasoning of the learned Chief Justice "marks
the entire separation" of the legislative and judicial depart-
l'£
ments of government. v Whether or not there is any possibility
to delegate this "exclusive" power centers upon the court's
interpretation of the separation of powers. Although this pro-
cess of legislative adjudication is in itself a glaring excep-
tion to that doctrine, it has been defended on the grounds
that this power is not to be delegated since it is solely a
legislative function. This presents a somewhat paradoxical
situation of an exception to the separation of powers theory
being supported by the same doctrine which it violates.
This return to a strict interpretation of powers theory
in Dlnan vs. Swig caused a great deal of comment. It was felt
that such an absolute interpretation was never intended by the
fathers of the Constitution. The provision in the Constitution,
which many felt gave the legislative power to delegate its
control of elections, was said by Chief Justice Rugg "not to
apply" in the Dinan vs. Swig case.^ The meaning of this case
37
^Denny vs. Mattoon, 2 Allen 36l, 37 9. Cf . Opinion of the
Justices 201 Mass. pp. 609-612.
^Constitution 0f the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Op.
£lt .
?
Cha&ter 1^-Seation III, Article XT . =
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1is still disputed since the grant of power giving the General
Court control over its elections also contains the clause that
the legislature may settle elections by any means it may think
best
.
Every expression in Massachusetts documents granting the
power to the General Court to be the judge of its own members
has also granted the power of the legislative assembly to dele-
gate this power. The first expression of the power of legis-
lative adjudication of the election of its own members in I63I4.
also allows the General Court "to order things amongst themsel-
ves that may concerne (sic) the well ordering of their body."'1'?
The Provincial Charter of 1692 permits the General Court to
"make such necessary orders for the due regulation thereof, as
they shall see occasion'.'lQ Thus these early powers of judging
the elections of its own members have also provided the Gen-
eral Court with the choice of either exercising this power
directly or delegating this power to meet the needs of the
occasion.
The provision in the Constitution of 1780 granting the
power of each House "to try and determine" all of its election
cases, specifically provides that the General Court may also
determine election cases "in such other way as they respectively
^Records of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay in New England,
op . cit., Vol • I, p. llj.2 .
^Edward Everett Hale, o£. cit
., pp. 167-173.
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think best. nl9 Thus it seems that more stress has been given t
the theory of separation of powers than in the actual grant of
the power. It appears that a different interpretation^ which
would allow the delegation, would be feasible in the future in
the light of the specific provisions, which permit the legisla-
ture to select the best means of handling election disputes.
The possibility of altering the present system of legislative
adjudication may be then possible* since those provisions seem
to indicate that this power may be delegated as long as the
General Court retained the power over elections in the
last analysis.
In summary, the origin of legislative adjudication was
the result of executive encroachment of a weak legislative
branch of government. However, with the development of strong
legislative and judicial branches of government in Massachuse-
tts, the original purpose of this power of the General Court
to be the judge of its own election returns no longer existed.
Within an expanded election system, Massachusetts has
realized the inadequacies of the traditional method of handling
election disputes. There has existed a growing discontent of
the present system even from election committees themselves.
Expression has been given for the need of an administrative
o
^Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Chapter I, Section III, Article XI.
..
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agency to cope with election problems. However, this possible
alternative has been prevented by the decision rendered in
Dinan vs. Swig 1916, which has ruled that such a delegation
would be void as a violation of n the entire separation" of
powers. There is reason to believe that the legal obstacle of
securing a more suitable alternative to the present system may
be obtained through the Constitutional provision which enables
the General Court to be the judge of its own elections or to
determine the matter "in such other way as they may respective-
ly think best . "20
The court's strict interpretation will not allow the pre-
sent delegation of power which has placed the courts in the un-
real dilemma of having to choose between application of a sepa-
ration that is "a practical and intellectual absurdity, and
seeming evasion of a constitutional mandate. "21 This power of
legislative adjudication of elections, which is an exception
to a separation of powers theory, presents a paradox when it is
defended on the grounds that to change this exception would
violate the theory to which this power is already an exception.
20Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts op.
cit
. ,
Chapter I, Section iii. Article XI.
21James Hart, Introduction to Administrative Law (New York
P. S. Crofts and Company, 1 9I4.6 ) , p . l7|7T.
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CHAPTER IV
NATURE OP CASES BEFORE THE GENERAL COURT
1* How Cages Are Classified :
The nature of the cases before the General Court reveals
that the problems to be settled involved many points of law whio
the legislature has difficulty in deciding. There are trends
noticeable in the various types of cases before the legislature
in different periods, which verifies a decline in the exercise
of the power over elections both in the substance of the cases
and the number of cases. As pointed out above, the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts has attached a great deal importance to
this power. The courts have defined this power of the legis-
h
Mature as being so vitally "exclusive” and "absolute" that they
would not allow this power to be delegated. 1 However, statis-
tical considerations of the nature and number of cases before
the General Court demonstrates that the legislature itself tends
to take a cursory view of election questions before it*
Before considering in more detail how well the legislature
exercises its power over elections, attention must be given to
the nature of the cases that appear before that body. A statis-
tical survey of contested elections in Massachusetts was
based on the published reports of election committees by author-
^Linan vs. Swig, 1916* 223 Mass. 516
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ized editors from 1780 to 1942,
2
A serach of the journals of
both houses of the General Court reveals only one case since
3
1942 which occurred in 1947. Therefore, for all practical pur-
poses, the scope of this study deals with contested elections
from 1780 to the present although the single case since 1942 is
not included in the statistical data and the scope is technically
limited to coincide with the same period covered by the legisla-
tive reports on contested elections.
The types of contested election cases were classified into
four main groups* The first group deals with questions of act-
ual election procedure which include the following cases:
A. Gases which deal with the proper time, place,* and notice of
the elect ion? constitute a major procedural questioh. B. The
motions of the townspeople to send representatives into the
General Court which in the early days was of considerable im-
portance since the town paid the expenses so that occasionally
4the town preferred "not to send." C. Corrupt practices at the
polls which might obstruct "free elections.”* D. Conducting elec-
^Sources for the statistical data is compiled from these
publications: Luther S. Cushing, Charles W. Storey, and Lewis
Josselyn, Report s of Controverted Electionslff80-1842 (Boston:
White and hotter, 1853) • Edward T5 . Loring and Charles T.
Russell, Report s o f Controverted Elections 1853-1885 (Bost cn:
Wright and Rotter, 1886). Charles T. Russell, Report s of Contest-
ed Elections Cases 1886 -1 90
2
(Boston :Wright and loiter T§02 )
.
Andrew A. Casassa. Rep orts of Contested Election Cases Paul L.
Howard, Report s of Contested”Elect ion Cases 1923-1942 (Bost on:
Wright and Potter, 1942.
)
3Kosenfeld vs. Fitzgerald 1947, J ournal q£ the House f pp 62,
seated.
85, 322, 340. To be discussed in ChapterV
4 Nantucket, Sharon 1815, Winslow 1815, Southridge 1817,
Emotion not to
send" stands to void subsequent elections and members thereby un-
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tions according to the law requiring the voters' list*was an
an important problem before the Civil War, E. Certifying and
receiving returns of the election according to legal authority
makes up the last and least important of the procedural questions
The second main classification of cases is that which deals
with the qualification of office-holders themselves. The quail
fication of office-holders has presented the following type of
problems: A, Domicile of the office-holder must be in the dis-
trict which he represents and many cases have resulted in the
legislature attempting to define the term "domicile" in its
legal sense. B. Compatibility of the office of members of the
General Court to other federal and state offices* constitute
another early problem. C. Conduct and character of member as t
*
whether member is inimical displays the exercise of the power
in matters of civil rights. D. Cases to clarify "duly elected"
by settling what constitutes a "ratable poll" have involved such
legal questions as what constitutes citizenship. E. Property
qualifications which were required of the office seeker were
judged by the legislature to determine that these requirements
were legally met. P. The problem of whether the office-holder
can be qualified without a signed certificate of election was
a minor problem before the legislature.
The third main classification is that of the qualification
of the voter which is further divided into: A. The legality of
'To \>€ Cov>S/'df?vtP Chifier VTt

the voters’ domicile was judged by the legislature. B. Tax,
age, and literacy qualifications for voting were also judged
by the legislature. C. Voters who can not qualify because they
*
are not properly registered is the major consideration in
this category revealing how the legislature regards the regis-
tration laws.
The fourth main classification is that which deals with
problems of counting the votes. Although this could have been
included under procedure of elections, it is a large and im-
portant enough item to be considered in a separate category.
The various problems of oounting votes are included in the
following problems: A. The problem is how to count markings
on the ballot which are not according to the prescribed oross.*
B# Presents the question of should the non-prescribed and unoff
cial form of ballot be counted? C. How should mistaken names
on the ballot be counted is a problem under the old system of
voting when names were written on the ballot. D. Problems of
double voting is another question which the legislature had to
answer. E. The question of what circumstances should be requir-
ed to justify a reoount*constitutefe the most important type of
case in recent years. F. Problems' of irregular counts whereby
the total number of votes cannot be ascertained is the last
category and includes all other miscellaneous problems in
counting votes.
This classification into the four main causes for contest-
ed election cases is not necessarily intended to be impeccable.
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However, the causes of election cases which are doubtful classic
fication are few in number. All cases are classified accord-
ing to the main point involved in the case but they may fall
.into more than one category. For the most part this classifi-
cation will serve t o illustrate the trends in the various cases
before the General Court. Since this study covers a considerable
span of time, the periods have been divided into twenty year
periods except the first period of 1780-1800 and the last 192 1-~
1941 which is made to include the two extra years in the 162
years under consideration. There are no cases reported for
1942 and only two cases for 1941 so that these additional two
cases should not distort the statistical picture very much.
Tabulations for the various types of cases that have been
reported before the General Court, have been noted in Table I.
Consideration of this table reveals significant trends in these
cases which will be considered in the next section. Charts I
and II graphically illustrate the contents of Table I and each
Chart will be considered separately in the following sections.
Chart I desciibes the trends in the nature of the cases and
Chart II illustrates significant factors as to how these cases
have been handled.
2. Statistical Trends in the Nature and Number of Cases ;
The first observation is that these contested election
cases tend to center around different questions in any given
period. For example, from 1780 to 1800 there were 41 cases
before the General Court and of these 41 cases, 26 cases or

Chart I
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OP THE DIFFERENT REASONS FOR
CONTESTING* ELECTIONS IN EACH PERIOD
,1780-1941
Total
1921-1941*
1901-1920
1881*^1900
1861-1880
1841-1860 3
1821-1840
1801-18*0
_
Key
I Procedure
1
<4ual .Office-holder
Qual .Voter
Counting Votes
1780-1800
cent 16 Xo M Vo to
No cases were reported for 1942 so that that year is not included. To divide
162 year period into 20 year periods, the extra 2 years were added to the
first period 1780-1800 and to the last period 1921-1941. A few cases fall
into more than one category so that a total over 100 percent is possible.
Sources for charts I* and II- cited supra
.
p. 41, footnote 2.
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63 percent of the cases in that period were concerned with the
i* chnt dr.
qualification of the office holder#^ Thirty- six and a half per-
cent of the cases in this period dealt with the character and
conduct of inimical members while another 12.2 percent involv-
ed questions of the compatibility of state and federal office to
membership in the General Court. These are the two most im-
portant questions which confronted the General Court in the
first twenty years under consideration. How effectively the
General Court decided these questions will be considered in
more detail in the following chapter under the sections of
compatibility of office and inimical members. Seven and three
tenths percent of the cases contained questions of the property
qualification of the office holder while another 4.9 percent
questioned the domicile of the member.
‘jevic'c^l
The next most important^ group of cases pertains to the
procedure of elections. This group of cases constituted 9
cases or 21 percent of the cases for that period of which 9.8
percent were cases involved with time, place and notice of
election, 7.3 percent related to motions in the town meeting
concerning the wish to send representatives to the General
Court, and 4.9 percent dealt with corrupt pfractices at the
election. No cases question**} the qualification of voters
appear in this period and only 2.4 percent cases involved
questions of counting the votes.
-Hie
From 1801 to 1820 there were 113 cases before the General
Court and the qualification of the office-holder was still the
most important question ta. be settled. It oongtitutad 40-7
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percent of all the cases of that period and 33.7 percent of
which specifically questioned the qualification of the sitting
members to determine whether the town had sufficient ratable
polls to allow the member a seat. Questions of procedure of
elections accounted for 23.2 percent of the cases in this
period. However, the questions of the qualification of the
office-holder still predominated this period. This period
witnessed the greatest number of cases reported to the General
Court. Within this twenty year period, 113 cases of the
-Lott* j 424 cases were reported. The trend in the decline of
contested election cases is illustrated in Chart II.
From 1821 to 1840 there were 59 cases and 25 of these
cases of that period or 42.4 percent, dealt with the procedure
of elections. The time and place of election constituted 13.6
percent and the motion to send representatives made up an
equal amount. The use of the voters' list was involved in 8.4
percent of the cases. The qualification of voters because of
the factors of tax, age, and literacy reached 10.1 percent of
the total. The cases concerning the counting of votes showed
an increase to 16.9 percent of the total in that period.
Cases dealing with the procedure of elections accounted
for 45 cases or 53 percent of the oases in the period of 1841
to 1860. It is interesting to note how the cases concernced
with the qualification of the office holder which predominated
the first forty years of contested elections have declined in
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the following periods. The most common question then before
the legislature for the next forty years from 1821 to 1860
pertains to the procedure of elections which include the admini
strative points such as giving notice or allowing sufficient
time for voting, conducting the election properly with a voters
list. These questions which are highlighted in each period wil
be considered in the next chapter to see how well the legis-
lature handled the decisions in some of the more important
questions which have been before the (Jeneral Court, in each of
these periods.
From 1861 to the present the cases relating to the counting
of votes have been by far the most frequent single question be-
fore the legislature. Thus an interesting trend is that contest-
ed election cases in the beginning were chiefly in regard to
the qualification of the office-holder. Now election cases have
had far greater reference to administrative problems such as
time, place, and notice of election, conducting election with a
voters' list, or merely the tedious recount of votes.
From the total of 424 cases reported, the average total
for the four main types of cases is as follows: I. Disputes
over election procedure constituted 28.4 percent of all the
cases. II. Qualification of the office-holder made up 26.2 per-
cent of the total cases. Ill Qualification of voters represent
ed only 8.2 percent. IV. The cases involving the count of votes
was the most frequent type of case before the legislature and
28.6 percent of the cases pertained to this problem.
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iSxcapt for the cases dealing with the qualifications of
voters, each of the three categories represent similar averages
However, each main problem had special emphasis at different
periods. For example, 72 cases of the 111 cases dealing with
the qualification of office-holders, were presented to the
General Court before 1820. Of the 122 cases pertaining to
election procedure, 70 problems alone were handled by the
General Court between the years 1821 to 1860, Cases involving
the questions of counting the votes indicated 68 of a total of
123 cases reported from 1861 to 1900, » Of the 28 cases before
the General Court in the last forty years, 21 cases pertained
to problems of counting the votes. This means that the main
question which still confronts the legislature is that of
counting votes.
Out of the 424 cases considered, 123 dealt with the pro-
blem of counting votes, and in each twenty year period from
1861 there were no less than 89 such cases. The problem of
counting votes and especially the recounts of votes have con-
stituted well over half of the cases contested since that
period of 1861. Indeed, 71.5 percent of the present election
problems centers around this question, which indicates that
the legislature is not effectively handling such questions.
How well the legislature has settled such cases will be dis-
cussed in the next chapter.
The purpose of legislative power seems to have shifted
from its historical purpose of guarding against executive en-
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concercning their members.^ This, of course, is a much broader
interpretation of the power to judge "return, election, and
qualifications of its awn members." This broader interpreta-
tion of "duly elected" has been used to cover every aspect of
election returns even though the legislature has no background
for making legal decisions. This shift has virtually made the
legislature the court of last aopeal in such matters as what is
a "mistaken name" on the ballot or upon what constitutes citizen-
ship of the voter, and what the legislature will consider as a
ratable poll. Obviously, these decisions involve many complex
points of law but the legislature has adjudicated a great variety
of legal points because of its tendency to include any question
dealing with elections under the scope of the "returns, elec'
tions, and qualifications of its own members" no matter how
remote the point may be.
3. Significant Factors
There are four significant factors which have a bearing
on how well the legislature exercises its power over elections.
The first factor is that almost all of these oases represent
a conflict of two political factions over a seat in the repre-
sentative assembly which indicates that there may be a politica
rather than a judicial motive in the handling of these cases.
This factor is not recorded on the Chart since virtually all of
these cases are in this category. The other factors are ill-
ustrated on Chart II which shows relatively few members are un-
Suora, Ghenter II.

IChart II.
SIGNIFICANT FACTORS AS TO HOW ELECTION CASES ARE HANDLED: NUMBER
OF REJECTED COMMITTEE REPORTS
*
OF UNSEATED MEMBERS, AND OF CASES *
n
Total
1780-1941
20 1+0 **0 3*0 390 SOO
1921-1941
1901-1920
1881-1900
k
1861-1680
m
1841-1860
TnTT'
i™
1821-1840
1780-1800
So io 10 to To too no no
Cases in which committee reports were
Cases resulting in unseating member.
Total number of oases.
rejected or ignored by General Court
• Periods and sources as oited supra . Chart I
A
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seated indicating that the methods employed by the legislature
tend to favor the sitting members. The third factor is the
imoortant point that 10 percent of the decisions handed down
in these cases, by the committee appointed to study election
casbs, have been either rejected, altered, or ignored by the
full house vote. This factor illustrates how political consi-
derations may enter into the settlement of election cases by
political rather than a judicial body where the majority rule
exceeds the rule of law. The last factor concerns the fact
that the exercise of this power has declined and is no longer
given the full attention, which these problems warrant. Fewer
cases in recent times suggests a dissatisfaction with the legis
lative handling of these cases.
It is significant to note that out of the 424 cases
6Hookinton 1783.
reoorted almost all of them were contested by candidates as-
piring to the seat of the sitting member. It is, of course,
Dossible for anyone to contest an election if one feels the
voting was not correct or if one was denied his legal rights
and the " ourity of the ballot box” has been interfered with.^
But the fact that most of these cases are often personal con-
flicts between two candidates for offices makes them in fact
an extended political campaign issue. The more extra-legal the
decisions appear, the more political expediency is apt to pre-
vail. The nossibility of sacrificing a legal precedent or elec
c
tion principle so that an individual case might be won, is
always present. Flaoing the stress on the results of an in-
dividual case is so greet that the long run aspects of election
administration may be sacrificed. The legislature has been
accused of being at its worst when it attempts to solve these
individual cases and party disputes, feigning judicial manners.
Election cases, which in most instances, involve two interested
parties is a good test to see how the legislature acts in- its
judicial capacity.
The fact that only £1.5 percent of these cases have re-
sulted in unseating members of the General Court indicates thst
the General Court has been lenient in tits decisions and that
the contested cases have been of a frivolous nature. The
:
General Court Rives a presumption in favor of the sitting member
which explains why comparatively few members are unseated. It
is also possible for a sitting member to be able to muster
enough votes to save his seat despite the committee recommenda-
tion. As a matter of fact a member whose seat is challenged in
one session may be one of the members of the election committee
deciding the case of a colleague in the next session. This
leaves the system open to political agreements among political
groups and factions which does not make for a judicious settle-
ment of cases. For example, one Edward J. Jenkins gained the
seat of the sitting member George A. Shaw in 1876 7 because it
was proved that the sitting member did not actually inhabit
vs. Shaw 1876.
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the district he represented. After Jenkins had gained this
seat in turn was challenged the very next year on the same
grounds that he had won his seat from the then sitting member,
which was on a point of domicile. Jenkins held his seat and
8
the petitioner was given leave to withdraw. However, Jenkins
had his seat challenged for a second time, but by 1879 he him-
self was already a member of the election committee. This is
but one examole to illustrate how the direct political contest
for a seat suggests that those contesting elections are more con-
cerned with winning a seat rather than correcting an election
wrong. The stress by sitting members is not what is legally
of
correct but rather the political consideration who can muster
a majority of votes to decide a case in one's favor.
The political factors in the background of legislative
handling of cases are more clearly highlighted by the fact
that 10 percent of all the committee reports have either been
altered, rejected or ignored by a full house vote. The tendency
for a majority vote of the full house to disregard the findings
of the election committees makes it possible for political
factors to dominate the settlement of election disputes. This
factor is a significant indication as to how it is possible
for the legislature to allow other than judicial consideration
influence its judgement.
A Dseudo-legal committee of elections, set un by the leg-
islature to study the individual cases and to hear all the
evidence, is supposed to report their opinions to the legisla-
ture for approval. The fact that these "opinions" can be over-
8Hayden" VS'.“F5hkins 1877.
9 Mulchinock vs Jenkins 1879.
..
f
*
'
.
*
j r. ! •: *f
'
ruled by a full vote by members who have not heard the full
evidence is indicative of the tendency to abide more by a
"majority rule” than the "rule of law." A simple majority in
such cases can overrule any legal principle or precedent since
the legislative action is final and they represent the "last
aooeal." No matter how much the decision denarts from strict
legality, any simple majority determines the final result sinc<
the house is not bound to legality. Within this area there is
great possibility of partisan interests to overrule any con-
scientious committee decision. In fact, the legislature can
decide these cases in whichever manner they are so disposed
to do, without reference either to the law or the committee
recommendations. The number of times the law itself has been
overlooked by the committee . Teports is indicated in the
case studies below, but the known number of occasions when
the committee reports have been rejected adds a greater de-
gree of unrestraint by the legislature in dealing with these
election problems. This tendency of not approving the Com-
mittee^ reoort is present throughout the entire history of
contested elections, but the trend is comparatively stronger
in more recent periods even when there are fewer cases to
consider.
The fact that the number of cases before the General
Court has declined considerably in reCent years, indicates that
the power is no longer exercised to a great degree. This factor
elucidates the neglect of this power by the legislature.
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Seventy four and four tenths percent of these contested elec-
tion oases have taken place before 1861. Another 22.8 percent
have taken place from 1861 to 1900. This means that only 6.6
percent of aontested election cases have been reported since
1901. From 1801 to 1820 there was on- the average of more than
five cases oer year before the legislature and since 1901 the
average has been reduced to slightly more than one case for
every two years. The fact that there has only been 28 cases
reported from 1901 to 1942 suggests that this decline in the
exercise of its power over elections is related to the decline
of the importance of this function to legislative assemblies.
As nointed out in a previous chapter when this power was grant-
ed to legislative assemblies it was one of the most important
means by which the legislature cou Id protect itself from
executive encroachment. When free legislatures became secure <*n<l no longer
"pacKedl" houses, then the legislatures no longer stressed the
importance of this power. The decline in the number of cases
before the General Court may be explained by the factor that
since the legislature no longer considers this function vital,
it has neglected to exercise of this power in more recent
years. The decline is probably more directly due to the fact
elections are not as frequent as they were in the early period
and the fact that problems that faced earlier lesislatures had
to be decided without guiding precedents except English practice.
However, the power to judge elections is not as frequently used
in recent years because the General Court has already built

such a body of precedent that it no longer requires a case to
decide minute questions as it did formerly. Now election
officials are more inclined to act on their own in doubtful
cases by looking to the precedents already established.
The decline in cases may also be explained by the fact
that the legislature has lost prestige in its treatment of
election cases and has failed to give the best possible inter-
pretation to the cases before it. Confidence in the ability
of the legislature to make sound legal decisions on questions
involved in these cases is waning. How well the legislature
has decided these questions will be considered in the follow-
ing chapter.
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CHAPTER V
HOW THE LEGISLATURE HAS DECIDER ELECTION PROBLEMS
1. Problems to be Considered :
In the previous chapter Table I listed four general types
of problems treated in legislative adjudications. Several of
the more important types of problems representative of each of
the above categories will be analized in the present chapter tp
illustrate arbitrary and non- judicious action by the legislature.
The nine special problems considered below include: (1) time
and place of elections. (2) notice of election. (3) free
elections. (4) voters' list. (5) compatibility of office.
(6) inimical members, (7) registration law, (8) markings on
the ballot, and (9) receiving and counting the votes.
2 . Time and Place of Elections :
A very basic element of any election is certainly the time
and place of the election. In a democratic election system the
time and place of an election must follow a prescribed manner,
because failure to do so may result in an unfair election where
legal voters may be deprived of their voting rights in early
eighteen hundreds. The town officials were held responsible
for the Procedure ox the town meeting to make certain that
basic town procedure did not deprive any one of his rights.
The town meeting procedure was considered so vital that many
elections would be considered void if not followed.-*- These cases
established the precedent in 1811-19 that if the motions to send
-Or-
r
e ot tentat iv e or of adjournment
'Rehoboth 1811, Roxbury 1813, Nantucket 1814, Nantucket and
Sharon 1815
,
Boston 18 18, G1 o uc e s
t
er 1816, Charlestown 1819
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were not properly put, or if there was not sufficient notice,
time, and discussion allowed, the elections would be void.
However, other decisions on the necessity of formal and
exactness of election conduct have offered more exceptions to
the normal practice of requiring the election conduct of the
town officials to conform with the legal requirement.^ For
example, in cases being disputed because of violation of time
requirements for the polls it was held that "an inconvenient
hour and lack of a voters' list" does not invalidate the elec-
tion. 3 It was held that if "time imolied from former usage is.
insufficient" then the election is void,
4
but "resonable" time
in IV/C,
was later defined, "twelve to twenty minutes sufficient if all
persons in the meeting house having a right to vote voted." 3
Later it was held "time of polls itself is insufficient to in-
validate the election. "6 °even days was held to be sufficient
time for a notice of an election, although the law at that time
specifically required fourteen. 7 The laws specifying the time
^Gushing, Parliamentary Law
,
op . cit . , p. 7£.
3Paris 1805.
4 Gloucester 1816.
5Phillipston 1851.
6
Adams 1840.
70range 1855.
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for the polls to be open and the conduct of using the ballot
box did not void this because the "intent of the officials was
8
honest." These cases were to allow a considerable amount of
discretion to election officials as to what constitutes "rea-
sonable" time seemed to have been stopped with the "sunset
cases" which fellow.
The law requiring that balloting after sunset would void
IP
the election was more strictly abided by at first. Many
elections were then declared void because the balloting had
taked place after sunset. However, these cases were liber-
ally interpreted, so that even elections after the time stated
in the law were held to be valid.^ This reversal in these
cases in such a short period of time had confused the election
officials into not knowing that if they had kept the polls
open after the legal time, their action would be interpreted
according to the "spirit of the law" and the election voided,
or whether the violation of the election law requiring polls
to be closed at a certain time would go unchecked. .Despite
8
Eowley 1843.
10
Massachusetts ^cts 1839, Chapter 42
,
^cts 1843, Chapter
42
,
Section 2 .
^
^Burlington 1843, Charlestown 1844, Sandwich, 1844.
^JPall Aiver 1844 and Bana 1847.
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the warning of the justices, the legislature continued to ad-
judge these cases on local customs without regard to the
written law. Cushing thought it manifest to maintain as uni-
form a system in point of time and mode of conducting elections
as possible throughout the state c but the legislature was not
consistent on that point.
To have such diverse opinions on such a basic factor as
the time requirements for an election certainly had many rami-
fications in election administration, since during the period
from 1820-1860 there were no less than seventy cases involving
basic procedural questions. . The same diverse decisions were
made concerning other basic procedural electicn laws so that
no uniform procedure even on the place of election was pos-
sible. It was first held that a change of meeting place would
void the elec t ion j^but ohangep in place and time of election
were allowed and considered valid two days before the election*^'
I So*].
3. Notice of election:
The matter of notices of elections follows the same pat-
tern of contrary rulings. Many of the notices of elections
have been judged accordingly to local town customs, although
14
12 Gushing, £2* £it:., p. 409.
13
Harwich 1800.
14Tisbury 1807.

•*3C
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the law required each town to "legally establish" a method of
15
notifying the people of the election. When the town failed to
comply with this law the General Court assumed that any notice
that was "customary and ancient" was valid. Following the
reasoning of Cooley in dealing with the notices of elections,
the treatment has usually been lenient since "the right to hold
the election comes from the statute and not from the official
notice." 17 The notice of election is to give the citizens addi-
tional publicity which is already expressed in the statute it-
self.
Methods giving notices not in the usual manner were held ,vi
] 8to void the election, and the rule "ample hotice must be given"
/Vih?V£>
was stated. However, it was later held that insufficient
20
notice "in the absence of fraud" would not void the election.
This decision was then followed by a series of more liberal in-
terpretations of the laws dealing with election notices, and
"notice of less than two hours does not void the election in
21
the absence of fraud. An irregular notice was held not to
void an election"since it was not proven that any voter was de-
"2?
orived of his right to vote.
15 Revised Statutes of Massachusetts, Chanter 5, Section 5.
16Holliston 1784, Braintree 1840, Clarksbury 1844.
17
Cooley, oo. olt_» p. 603.
1 ft
York 1812.
19
Lanesborough and New Ashford 1814.
20west Boylst on 1840.
^Warwick 1840.
2 ^Hiliman vs * T’lfi-uders 1880 .
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%23Although the law required seven days, the committee did not
want the voters to be deorived of their vote "through circum-
stances beyond their control,” and, therefore, the committee
"felt that if the voters are actually notified that the purpose
24
of the law is fulfilled.” Thus it is obvious that there are
Drecedents stating a sufficient notice of an election is not
essential and other Drecedents which state an election will be
voided if sufficient notice is not granted.
4. Free Elections:
of
- corTUft Y’C^c'fcice.s
The ouroose of "keening elections free”A has also been uti-
lized in unseating members of the 'General Court. One representa
tive was charged with winning the election ”by bribery",
by corruoting the minds of as many as he could by "snirituous
aS
liquor," but it was voted that he should hold his seat, * e pfrnt'fte.
•vei'bj'fceJ
serving refreshments" did not affect the election,, in the Sanford
and Alfred case- iy\ - JSGfc 4^ ihe me.Ynker V\el4 Y*;s se$tz.
However, the oetition of fVeoresentat ive Hlbridge Fuller
was denied because Fuller "offered to treat with forty glasses
of rucu" 27 in IS35:
md
^Acts of 1907, Chanter 560, Section 246.
^ 4Pratt vs. Sargent 1912.
2 Mansfield 1784.
26Sanford and Alfred 1806.
27Hlbridge Fuller 1835.
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»The Hubbardston ease ru*le l that "treating the voters does
p D
not invalidate" the free election Drinci Die, "even though fraud
"practised at the ballot boxes, and on the ballot boxes, are
believed to originate in the use of ardent spirits." Again in
1877 the rule that "distribution of cheoks redeemable in liquor
and cigars will not void the election if they do not influence
2 9the voter and are unknown to the candidate" was restated.
The definition of what constitutes a "free election" can be
then made to vary with the political expediency of the occasion
Thus, by assuming the full exercise of "exclusive cowers" by a
broad definition and by its inconsistent application of prece-
dents, the legislature can readily abuse the privilege of ad-
judication so as to defeat the purpose of the very election law
they themselves make to nrotect freedom of elections.
s
*
i
5. Voters 1 List :
Let us examine this rule of thumb method of hearing cases
and see how it applies in practice to the question conducting
elections. A good example can be illustrated in the cases deal
ing with the required voters' list which consisted of all those
citizens authorized to vote.
28Hubbardst on 1839.
^Prescott vs. Grossman 1877 . Cf*
c h4fi*x ltx
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The voters’ list was required in order to prevent fraudulent
or illegal voting. It is interesting to note that, although
Massachusetts was one of the most progressive states in adoot-
ing early election reforms, that many of these election pre-
cautions have often been voided by action of the legislatures
in adjudicating elections to their respective houses. In two
consecutive election cases, E. Nicholls retained his seat, when
in the first case no action was taken by the legislature and
when in the second case it was ruled that the "statute requir-
rzQ
ing a oublished voters’ list did not affect the election."
31
This same rule was restated ten years later, but a few years
later the rule was established that the "Selectmen are not ob-
liged to allow anyone to vote who is not on the required voters'
list." 3^ This rule tends to uDhold the statute and emphasize
the necessity of a voters' list, whereas, the previous cases
make voters’ list merely ootional although it was prescribed by
33
law. Other cases returned to the original interpretation that
the failure to use the voters' list does not void the election
34in the absence of fraud.
30Malden 1817.
31Windsor 1827.
3
^Iynnfield 1833.
^Massachusetts Statutes, Chapter 42, Sections 5-6.
34
Marblehead 1834 and Westborough 1840.
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However, this rule was contradicted two years later when Ebenez
Parker was unseated because of a failure to use a voters’ lisiff
The following year Eli Moody was unseated for the same rea-
son, although the selectmen personally knew the email number of
voters in the town, and there was no question of fra&d. Thus,
the meaning and value of a voters' lists is controlled only by
the inclination of any given legislative body at any given time
This lack of standards by which to judge the necessity of a
voters' list to an election is thereby reduced to the disDosi-
tion of that body. It is easy to see how such a system is vul-
nerable to arbitrary measures and how the temptation for a
oolitical narty seeking as many seats for its party as possible
can readily be subjected to the needs of political expediency
rather than any principles that might be called election juris-
orudence.
The dichotomy of orecedents concerning the use of the
voters' list is very clear. VThenever a committee wishes to
enforce stringently the use of the list for a particular elec-
tion, a committee may cite the Granby case in 1843 which
stressed the importance of the voters' list to the degree that
the failure to A it voided the election even "when the officials
knew all the voters personally" and there was no question of
„ ,
37
fraud
.
er
35princeton 1842.
^Granby 1843, Malden 1817.
.
However, if the committee should feel that a ’’leaning toward
liberality” is in order, the Malden case of 1817 can be cited
which would allow the law requiring a published voters * list
impact it chooses to the law requiring the use of a voters'
at elections, in order to prevent people not qualified to vo
from doing so. The "valuable precedent" which supports what-
ever position the committee favors, of course, is the one to
be cited. A return to the orinciDle that a voters' list was
greater free interpretation when it was later ruled that "
names added and removed from the voters' list illegally,
40
do not void the election". If this rule is coupled with the
rule that no one may vote who is not on the voters' list, then
it was evident that the manner that election officials in the
various towns may employ these rules to guide their conduct-,
41
is unrestrained. Indeed, such was the very situation in the
early periods that resulted in arbitrary and irregular con-
duct of election officials which resulted in many cases before
the General Court. It cannot be proven conclusively that the
arbitrary decisions of the General Court also encouraged the
38Malden 1817.
rsg
Needham 1851.
40
Ames vs. Beebe 1880.
41
V/hitaker vs. Commings 1883.
38
to be ignored. Thus the committee is free to give whatever
optional was made in 1851, and this rule was given even
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local officials to conduct the election in a like mainer and
have also encouraged frivolous contested cases, but if we can
consider that more than twenty-eight per cent of all the cases
deal with such procedural problems as these, there is a strong
reason to believe that local election officials have been en-
couraged if not confused over similar contradictions of im-
nortant election laws by decisions of the General Court.
The fact that only twenty-one Dercent of these cases
have resulted in unseating sitting members indicates also that
these varying decisions of the General Court may encourage so
to risk a contest. These early decisions reflect the same so
of administratioh by the local election officials, since if
voters' list is deemed unnecessary and not essential for a
valid election, then this oninion is taken as a legal truism
by officials and they tend/ to merely, disregard the use of a
vot ers ' list •
This attitude has many ramifications down to the oresent
and an "irregular use of the voting list in absence of fraud
does not void the election" seems to be the rule of the orese
'The Cahill vs. Moyse case denied a recount of votes because
failure to use voters 1 list was not sufficient grounds for a
recount even though there was question of unauthorized voters
me
rt
the
4
^Cahill vs. Moyse 1935.
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gThese cases indicate the difficulties involved in attempting t
apply a sound system of registration in the Commonwealth as lo
as the General Court holds this varying position in such funda-
mental election procedure. One of the chief dangers of this
blew is that the safeguard against fraudulent and double vot-
ing is sacrificed. The laws requiring a voters' list are a
farce if they are to be enforced in their stricter sense only
when "fraud can be Proven." The Durnose of the voters' list
is to prevent the "dead", multiple, and "hidden" voters that
tend to creep into party politics, and anything less than
general applicability of this law defeats its very purpose.
These laws are intended to prevent fraud, and to make fraudu-
lent attempts at the ballot box impossible these laws must be
constantly operative if the "reneaters" and "phantom" voters a
to be eliminated. Cooley refers to the voters' list as "being
45imperative and mandatory and cannot be disregarded."
Massachusetts, which pioneered in registration laws for
the country as early as 1800, has in fact fallen behind in an
44
application of those laws since. Can any such law have its
re
43Cooley, 0£. cit .
,
o. 602.
44Harris, op. cit., Chapter 1.
- £
(
)
intended impact if it is thus "liberally” interpreted so that
any meaning can be read into it? If a registration law and the
voters’ lists are important to the management of elections in a
vast democratic state, then they must be enforced. If they are
not vital, then it does seem not necessary to have to have laws
45
regulating such practices. However, the laws do go into de-
tails of the voting lists, and if the legislature did not expea
these laws to be complied with, then there appears to be no
point in Passing such laws if the meaning of the law and its
provided penalties can be so easily disregarded as indicated
above.
t
6. Compatibility of Offic e:
The question of compatibility of office of representatives
to the Greneral Court and other state and federal offices has
not troubled the legislature since twenty years before the
civil war. The considerations given to this question were
not consistent. The General Court ruled that the office of
army chaolin was incompatible with that of representative and
46
so the representative from hracutt was unseated. The unseated
representative repeated the same procedure, was again re-elect-
ed by the people of hracutt, but he was unseated again. This
c^se was called an abuse of the concept elegibility”of common
right” and has some similarity to the case of the thrice un-
45 General Laws of Massachusetts, Chapter 5, Section 55-63.
^Case of Solomon Aiken, hracutt 1814. 51- Ci»,sti‘M‘Iovi He
c Ji+fteciEi: .SectJoh X, sreef/c. offices ''PCo*»vi>ff,'Me
Goovf.
^
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seated Rilkes in England. Declaring the office of army chaolin
as incomnatible with the office of state legislator, although
other army officials were not questioned on those grounds,
47
appears to be an inconsistency. The resolution of 1789 de-
clared that federal offices and state offices were incompatible
offices, and the Attorney General Christooher Gore was forced
48 AQ
to resign, and the famous Judge Sewall was unseated. ' In
50
soite of th8 incompatible clause in the constitution, the
office of U. S. Commissioner of Bankrupts 5 "^ and the office of
deputy Post Master 5 ^' were both considered as compatible offices
although the good professor Asahial Stearns was unseated because
of the same constitutional clause and the office of Professor of
Harvard College was deemed "incompatible" 55 and yet the same
clause was not made to aooly to the other officers mentioned
concerning the United States office of superintendent of break-
water; the "committee is not of the opinion that this is an
47Cant. Perry Easton 1780.
45Christ ooher Gore of Boston 1789.
49York 1790.
50
Constitution Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Chapter VI
section 2 (later ammendad Article VIII.).
51
Jonathan Austin 1803.
sp
Sanford & Alfred 1806.
Asahial Stearns, Charlestown 1817.
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United States office and the Committee is not satisfied that
the amendment (Article VIII) includes such cases "so the membe
was allowed to hold his seat” although others were unseated by
54
the same article for similar offices.
7. Inimical Members :
Further abuses ean be seen in the early Period in an
attemot to purify the legislature of ’’inimical members” and
keep the elections free. John Williams of Deerfield was un-
seated because his "character and conduct” was friendly to the
55
British and violated old anti-British laws; ° John Williams was
re-elected again by the people of Deerfield, and this time it
56
was ruled that a "former exclusion does not disqualify.
But many other cases involving those alleged "not friendly to
the cause of America" 5 ^caused many to be unseated or to resign,
making "no attempt to sit in the honorable House again." The
old anti-British laws applied in 1783 when Jerathmiel Bowers
"must quit his seat" 88 because he expressed pro-British senti-
59
ments
•
54Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Article VIII.
55
Hesolbes of the General Court April 7, 1777 and March
10, 1761.
88John Williams, Deerfield 1783 and 1785.
87Vassalborough 1781.
88Swansey 1783.
59
Journal of the House 1783 o. £6, 29, 30.
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Abiel Wood, refusing even to answer charges against "character
60
and conduct" was cited for contempt, and expelled. The charge
61
of "Quakerism" was brought against Joshua Hubbard but not
proved, therefore he held his seat.
Cases against "inimical members" are restricted in Massa-
chusetts to the early period from 1780 to 1800. However, New
York can be cited for an example of how this power over
"inimical members" contains the seeds of political discrimina-
tion which may be abused in times of emotional crisis. New York
state legislature had witnessed an example of expelling five
Socialistic members in 1920 on the grounds that "they were
inimical to the best interests of New York." The possibility
of unseating representatives to the General Court because they
might express pro-Soviet sentiments today is also feasible,
just as members were unseated for expressing pro-British senti-
ments in a century and a half ago.
8. Registration Law .
’
There is continued fluctuation between a "liberal" and
"stingent" construction of election laws which continues through-
out the entire period of contested elections under considera-tio^.
1
ournal of the House 1784, p. 51.
61
62
Barnstable 1840.
Zechariah Chafee, Fre e Speech in the United States
Harvard University Press, T546l~pp, 270, S’/s, 280,
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The contrary views conflict sharply in the majority and minorit
opinions of the Mansfield vs. Hitchins case of 1886. Dispute
6 S
over the law requiring the voters to register in person if
they wanteoltheir names added to the list of qualified voters W45
in point. The majority opinion in this case strongly favored
a strict construction of the law and stressed the fact that at
least fifty illegal votes had been received and that the offi-
cials knew that their practice of not requiring registration
in person was "contrary to the spirit of the law, improper end
illegal."
The majority restates the requirements of citizens to re-
gister in person to qualify for voting as the law specified,
and declares that the law must be construed as mandatory.
Pointing out that ignorance of the law excuses no one and that
loose construction would lead to the nullification of the law,
the committee reported:
To hold these provisions merely directory
would leave the determination of the voter's
qualifications to evidence heard after the
election, and to nullify all statutory pro-
visions requiring the determination of the
right of suffrage prior to casting the ballot,
placing the burden on those who claim illegal
votes were cast
,
not only to search out the
alleged illegal votes, but to show their want
of qualifications, instead of requiring them
to appear and prove their right to the ballot. 64
6 %assachusetts Acts 1884, Chapter 298, Sections 21-27.
64Mansfield vs. Hitchins 1886.
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The minority report did not stress the facts in the case
but quoted the general principle of Judge McCracy’s "leaning
to liberalities" and cited other cases of loose construction
such as the Whitake r vs. Cummings of 1883 which they deemed to
a "wise and sound" decision. The "loose" construction plea
followed the same general pattern:
The whole tendency of decisions, particularly
in Massachusetts where there has been a failure
to comply with the laws regulating the forms and
proceedings governing elections, has been to
regard such provisions as directory in their
nature, and not mandatory. The tnndency of
the decisions in Massachusetts has been, not
to rigidly adhere to the old maxim, "ignorance
of the law excuses no one.
The minority report was not satisfied that over fifty il-
legal votes were cast, but they insisted that it must be proved
for whom these votes were cast and that they affected the result
of the election. Indeed, such proof in a case of this nature
is virtually impossible. However, the report of the majority
was overuled by the house vote and the minority report was
accepted.
The minority report was accepted and thus the precedent
was established that the law which required a voter to apply in
person in order to have his named added to the list of quali-
fied voters, is only "directory". Such votes by citizens who
6 5Ibid p. 12.
6
^Barr, Petition 1876.
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were not legally registered were held to be coanted "when cast
6 7in good faith and received without obj action, " This is an in-
teresting example of the General Court allowing citizens to
qualify for voting contrary to the unequivocal terms of the law
that nno name shall be added” to the T list "unless the applicant
6 ft
appear in person." This decision directly contradicts the
previous precedent which held that a citizen who was not proper
ly registered "has no right to vote, and if he votes, his vote
£Q
should be rejected." Allowing illegally registered citizens
to vote contradicts another earlier precedent which stated that
citizens must strictly observe the registration laws if they
are to be qualified voters, and that "a personcannot be regis-
tered as a voter after the expiration of the time fixed by law.
It is apparent that the legislature is inconsistent in what
it deoides in regard to what constitutes a legally registered
voter.
70
9. Markings on the Ballot .
A problem that has troubled the legislature in more re-
cent cases is that of deciding how various markings on the bal-
6 7
Mansfield vs. Hitching 1886.
68
Massachusetts Acts, 1884, Chapter 298, Section 21.
69
Vhitaker vs. Cummings 1883.
70Claflin et al vs. Wood 1881
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lot should be counted when they do not conform to the markings
prescribed by law. The latent ambiguity of odd and sundry mar-
kings are settled by the intent of the voter and the precedent
has been established that all assortments of markings are to
be counted as long as the intention of the voter is ascertain-
71
able. The old Scottish test for the handling of doubtful
ballots is followed by the General Court and the only restric-
tion on doubtful ballots is that if the voter "keeps a straight
course between the Scylla of uncertainty and the Charybdis of
identification the vote is good, although the mark is not made
precisely in the way pointed out in the directions." Mas-
sachusetts has set the pace of liberally judging markings on
the ballot making it a rule of law that "a mark upon the of-
ficial ballot shall be counted as a vote, even if not in the
prescribed place or form" providing that the mark reveals the
73intention of the voter. This precedent follows the rulings
under the old system of voting when names of the candidates
which were misspelled or inaccurately written were all counted
Southwick vs. Hart, 1890, Andrews vs. Gardner 1900.
72
Charles T. Kussel, 0£. cit . , Note by the Hditor, p.90.
73
Chief Justice Shaw, jjjx parte Strong
,
20 Picl. 484.

7 4if the intent was reasonable clear.
The liberal interpretation was extended by the General
Court to allow specific violation of the Australian Ballot Act
which prescribed the method of marking the ballot so that any
ballot should not be identified by soecial markings. Desoite
the provisions of the law which prescribed the marking of a
cross* ballots which were "defective and marked irregularly
75
under the present law" were held to be valid. T he legisla-
ture reasoned that the previsions of the ballot act which spe-
cified that a voter "retire alone to one of the voting shelves
and shall prepare his ballot by marking in the approoriate mar-
gin or place a cross opposite the name of the candidate of his
choice" 76 were to be considered as directory rather than man-
datory. The committee ruled that since the statute did not
explicitly declare that irregular markings would void the ballot
that "the utmost liberality in favor of the ascertainment of the
^Ashfield 1850, Gumming vs. Cole 1858, Chapin vs. Snow
1864, Wright vs. Hooper 1865, and Arnold vs. Champney 1867.
These old cases allowed the abbreviated, misspelled, and inac-
curate use of the candidate ' s name to be counted as a legal vote.
This precedent under the old system was carried over to the Aus-
tralian method of voting with printed ballots and the use of
crosses for secrecy of the ballot. Therefore, improper markings
on the ballot were also allowed to be counted according to in-
tent just as errors in the writing of the candidate’s name was
allowed previously.
Shepard vs. Sears 1890.
7 fi
Acts of 1889, Chapter 413, Sections 10, 23, 26.
,f
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expressed will of the voter” is granted.
It should be noted here that although Massachusetts pre-
cedent allows the ballot to be counted according to intent,
other states refuse to accept the Massachusetts precedent.
Other states follow the rule that "a ballot is the only expres-
sion of the voter's will, and it must be counted according to
its legal effect." The reasoning of those who object to
using the criterion of voter's intent rather than the strict
enforcement of the ballot laws, state that "it is not enough
that the intent of the voter is clear; it must be expressed in
78
the manner provided by law." In these states where there is
no attempt to conform to the terms of the law, no consideration
is even given to the ballot since it isheld that if the voter
can not intelligently comply with the provisions of the voting
law, then the "intelligence of his ballot" must be limited. 79
The reasoning that the intention of the voter cannot be con-
sidered in determining the legality of the ballot appears to
be the more substantial interpretation. However, the contrary
^Charles T. Russell, oo_, cit
.
.
pp. 89-100. Some of the
states which refuse to hold the provisions of their respective
ballot laws as "directory" and insist terms of the law be
strictly comoiled with; include California, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, New Jersey, Ehode Island, South
Dakota.
7®Loc. cit .
79loc cit
.
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rule as held by the General Court caused much difficulty in
settling cases under this liberal interpretation.
The arjfcousness for the General Court in following its
rule on the marking of ballots is presented not from the reason-
ableness of the precedent itself but rather by differences in
fact. The problem of what constitutes "intent" has made the
precedent difficult to apply in these cases. Intent of the vo-
ter can be a remarkably vague concept especially if amember of
the election committee choses not to "clearly see" the intent
even when the facts of the case are distinct, for example,
in one case a ballot had names of two candidates (where
two representatives were to be chosen) marked with a single
large cross outside and to the right of the squares to indicate
that the single cross was for the two names which appeared next
80
to each other on the ballot. The ballot was not counted for
either candidate although it was clearly the intention of the
voter to "mark two" candidates of his choice with the one
large cross covering both blocks since in other sections of
the ballot where it was indicated to mark one, the regular
size crosses were used and placed within the blocks. Although
the facts in this case were clear and the indications made by
the voter were lucid, the different factions in the election
committee refused to allow this vote to be counted. Other in-
80Adams vs. Moore 1895

tentions by the voters were not counted by the committees
because it was felt that the intent was doubtful and that the
81
difference in the markings might have been significant.
It was held in a case dealing with the of stickers
or pasters which are attacHeJl, to the ballot to indicate a
preference of a candidate whose name does not appear on the
ballot, that officials should refuse stickers not in confor-
mity of the law. 8 ^ This is a contradiction of the principle
of counting ballots according to the intent of the voter. It
is obvious that a sticker attached to a bellot is a clear in-
dication of the intent of the voter to vote for the candidate
whose name apnears on the sticker. The General Court reasoned
that stickers not in conformity with the law should not be
accepted by officials because once it is accepted according to
the rule that ballots must be counted according to intent, it
must therefore be counted^ otherwise the voter is disenfran-
chised. The point was circumvented however, when the General
Court added that it would have been legitimate to refuse the
ballot in which the intent war clear but not in conformity
with the law, and this would not have been considered a dis-
franchisement of the voter. Refusing to acdept ballots not
^Morgan, pet. 1696., Sullivan vs. Allen 1897, Moore vs.
Booth 1910.
82
Harvey vs. Bradbury 1920.
oa 1 2
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in conformity with the law although they clearly expressed
the intention of the voter, does not follow the precedent.
SE
The ihtent of the voter was not followed in another
case which was concerned with the use of stickers on the offi
was attatched to the ballot indicating an intention to vote,
for a certain candidate not on the ballot. The sticker was
not marked with a cross but merely attatched and there were no
other marks on that section of the ballot which indicates the
cross was inadvert erfLy omitted. However, the General Court
ruled that unless the sticker was also marked with a cross
as prescribed by law which stated that the "voter shall mark a
cross," the intent of the voter was held not to be exoressed.
Being aware of the shift in precedent the attorney-general was
asked for his ppinion of this interpretation of the markings
on the ballot. The attorney-general
,
Albert B. Pillsbury sug-
gested that this case warrants "a somewhat stricter construction
in favor of the purity, the secrecy, and the intelligence of
it O C
the ballot, than has ordinarily been applied to election laws?
This suggested stricter construction of the election laws, of
course, would mean a reversal of the precedent of judging bal-
85Charles T. Russell, ojd. cit .
,
Opinion of the Attorney-
General, p.48.
83
cial ballot i°/w- It was obvious in this case that the sticker
83I;oherty vs. Haggerty 1891.
84
Acts of 1889, Chapter 413, Section 23
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' t
lots according to intent rather than to the specific legal
provision of the ballot laws. The General Court strictly ap-
plied the terms of the law in thip particular case but contin-
ued to judge ballots according to the intent of the voter
8 6
despite the provisions of the ballot laws. The General
Court continued to count check marks and just plain diagonal
87
lines as acceptable votes and held that the law stating a
cross was to be used, was only directory.
-u • h "fliere is a law that prohibits any attempt by the
voter to "place any distinguishing mark upon his ballot" 88 and
the voter is specifically prohibited from using "any mark" by
which it (the ballot) may be identified," 89 The terms of these
laws have been ignored by the legislature as "merely directory"
even though the law provides a penalty of "imprisonment for not
more than six months or a fine of not more than one hundred
dollars. However, all sorts of markings which may be con-
sidered as distinguishing marks have been counted as valid
votes. The legislature has accepted such distinguishing marks
as an oblique line, check marks, double crosses, and ballots
marked with a T, Y, or V as being valid. 91 Any odd sort of
marking on the ballot has been accepted with the explanation
86
87
88
89
Andrews vs. Gardner 1900.
Dennett vs Sullivan 1910.
General Laws, Tercentenary Edition,
Ibid . . Chapter 54, Section 80.
9Qlbid
.
,
Chapter 56, Section 31.
Chapter 56, Sec. 31.
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that the "consciousness that this House should not be guilty
of causing the disfranchisement of the voters who have de-
posited their ballots in good faith." The methods by which
these cases concerning the markings on the ballot are decided,
indicate that the legislature has not followed the intent of
the voter in all cases and that specific provisions of the bal-
lot laws were disregarded as "merely directory" despite the
advice of the attorney-general that these ballot laws ought
to be more strictly internreted.
10. Receiving and Counting the Votes
:
The problem of counting the votes is more pronounced in
recent years. The law prescribing the type of envelope to
be used at the polls was held to be mandatory in Taft vs, Cole
931858. The shift in the line of reasoning of the committees
is remarkable. This case has put emphasis on the law and re-
fused to allow the law to be ignored. The committee would not
consider the Act of 1653 (prescribed envelopes) as merely di-
rectory because the committee could not entirely disregard the
94
express provision of the law.
There the illegal votes were not counted, but the
Whitaker vs. Cummings case in the Senate 1883^ presents a dif-
ferent approach to the same problem. This case contradicts
92
93
94
Harvey vs. Bradbury 1920.
Russell and Loring, Pease Petitions 1883, op. oit .
,
p.376.
Public Statutes of Massachusetts, Chapter 7, Section IV«
-. V r
the decision of Taft vs. Cole case and applies a "liberal”
interpretation, and since the "intention of the voter is ap-
parent, although contrary to the law, the committee felt the®
illegal votes must be counted.” The reasoning becomes more
intriguing when it makes a fine distinction between "counting"
and the "reception" of such illegal ballots in an unofficial
95
envelope, but they felt that, since the law does not spe-
cifically forbid the "counting" of such ballots, if such il-
96
legal ballots are received, they therefore should be counted.
Obviously, this line of reasoning is an opeh invitation to ir-
regular election procedures, since this would permit election
officials to admit any vote whioh would be counted if this
reasoning were followed. This fine distinction does appear to
be another method of talking around the law. The precedent
"when the ballot has been once received in the ballot box it
97
is then to be counted" can only encourage the use of question-
able procedures. This Whitaker vs. Cummings case is one in
^Public statutes of Massachusetts, Chapter7, Section IV.
Q C
Cf. ante Section 8, similar distinction between "re-
ceiving" and counting" illegal ballots was made in Harvey vs.
Bradbury 1920 where it was ruled that it was not oroper to
reoeive ballots which were not according to legal provisions
but once received these ballots then must be counted.
^Tobey vs. King 1659
/>
/
f
J
.
whioh results were declared a tie, since this "loose interpre-
tation” changed the plurality of the two votes difference be-
tween the contesting parties. The opinion of the committee
"that this provision of the statute is directory" allowed the
counting of two illegal votes and changed the result of the
98
entire election and contradicts the precedent which refused
to allow ballots not in prescribed envelopes to be counted.
Upon the legality of receiving and counting votes that are
not according to the law, the Tobey vs. King case of 1859 quotes
the liberal rule of "not punishing the innocent for the faults
of the guilty""and allows the illegal votes to be counted.
However, in St irnpson vs. Breed in 1876 the interpretation for
that particular case was strictly cotvst-wedl, and the illegal
votes "are invalid and must be set aside." Thus, if the com-
mittee is inclined to overlook the law, the "liberal" reason-
ing is applied quoting the long list of cases that have ignor-
ed the letter of the law honsVrvc-tion.^^If
,
on the other
hand, the committee intends to apply the strict letter of the
law, stress is put on the consequences of ignoring the law and
the danger of such precedents. Either type of reasoning is
readily applied, to suit the disposition of the committee. The
"Taft vs. Cole 1858, North Chelsea 1852.
"Tobey vs. King 1859.
lOOpreyebugh, Malden, Holliston 1834, Charlestown, Free-
mans, Townsends case. Pease Petition 1883, Plymton 1851, Hill
man vs. Flanders 1880.
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warning by on© of the committees in regard to the incons ist ency
in decisions concerning points of law, is noteworthy:
The house ought not to sanction a direct
and palpable violation of the provisions
of this statute, nor establish a precedent
that may hereafter afford a cover to fraud.
It is apparent that sound policy, and a
dire regard to the safety and purity of
elections alike demand that the requirements
of so important a statute be strictly and
literally obeyed. 101
Despite protests against "looseness" the inconsistent deci-
sions upon election principles did much to encourage these cases
For example, the rule that recounts will not be granted due to
"closeness without preliminary proof" was established in earlier
102
cases* However, there were exceptions to the rule when re-
counts have been made because of "probable error" or on the
"belief" that the "count may be irregular" or on closeness of
103
the vote*
r
These exceptions of course, void the purpose of
the principle that the General Court would be stfict with accep-
ing recount cases* Before a recount is made the Oeneral' Court
insisted that those "seeking to be recounted had to first avail
themselves all of statutory rights" before the legislature
104
would grant a recount, but the 7loose" interpretation in
101
Stimpson vs. Breed 1876. Refers to Aot of 1874, Chapter
376, Sections 27, which required errors in the returns to be
reported under oath of officials after careful investigation.
^^Rice vs. Welch 1868, Burt vs. Babbitt 1872, Austin vs.
Sweet 1873, Newell vs. Coffin 1903, Bergerson & Hayes vs. Ames
& Symonds 1923.
103 Kimball vs. Tilton 1878, Moore vs. Booth 1910.
^^Cahill vs. Moyse 1935, Willis vs. McElroy 1935.?et,"*‘'W>v.s
to d'lT s i- Bfce pY»vis*on ©t i (pre/i^i/v^fovy
before fKe I covxSidjsr
^
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later cases disregarded this precaution against frivolous dis-
putes and labelled such precautions as a "mere technical obstruc-
tion."105
Another reversal of principle which is reflected in these
recount cases is that a "charge in one district cannot be used
/06
to discredit the accuracy of the officials in another district.
In actual practice this was not followed consistently, and it
soon became the practice that, if fraud appeared in one district
the entire vote would be counted. In one case the committee
examined 11,159 ballots although there were only thirty-seven
ballots protested. After examining each ballot it was discov-
ered that "the fraud was confined" to the ballots originally
107disputed. A rather humorous application of the exception was
when a petitioner sought a recount in one district and the sit-
ting member at his own request wanted all the districts to be
counted, so all the 13,000 votes were counted. The protested
district did not affect the result, but the other districts,
counted by the sitting members own request, resulted in a change
X08
in the final count which unseated him.
9-
105Newell vs. Coffin 1903, Scribner vs. Keyes 1877.
^06Rounseville vs. Hathaway 1935. In 1947 when Nathan Rosen
feld petitioned for a recount for part of the 10th Worcester di
trict, incumbant Maurice Fitzgerald filed a petition stating
that a full recount should be made of the entire district "in
any part of said district." Both were given leave to withdraw.
107
Willis vs. McElroy 1935.
108
Chaflin vs. Wood 1880, Newell vs. Coffin 1903.
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Exceptions to the general rale, where full recounts were
granted although only one district was protested, became more
frequent. The legislature strongly enforced the rule to void
any recounts which were not strictly authorized by law. When
applying the statutes which presciibed the time and method of
recounts by election officials themselves, the General Court
insisted upon strict compliance with the lawx}s m the c$se Hjsfrell
vs- C losson ,vi
The case tends to show that in the opinion
of the house, at that time, the statute ought
to be strictly interpreted and complied with...
It should be borne in mind, however, that the
acts of dishonest parties might be the same
and that the intention is often difficult
of discovery. 109
9 )
Since this principle is not consistently applied, many
oases have been contested simply because the petitioners felt
the vote was close and a recount might change the results.
These "loose" interpretations have given in to some of these
appeals, and recounts have been readily granted in some cases
even though the petitioners had first not "availed themselves
of -recounts by otf'dab «» Acts I97V-, 37^
of all of their statutory rights" and without any proof of
cause. The warning protest of one committees seems to have
material! zed » Co>n*nittee objet+ecP to recooyfts by Hie 6ei Ca»
;>A fx-el.'vni'My' t €.covj vit 5
>yov,'<M. by Acts /m, 0,^376 ui*, not firsf
officials: 'Granting a recount, under the above
circumstances, seems to the undersigned
a good-natured yielding to the natural
desire for one more chance at fortune's
wheel. 110
109.
Haskell vs. Closson
of 1874 which voided recounts by official
ed therefore had elapsed, "in chapter 376,
110ieimhA.n vs. Tilton 1878.
1875. The law rererea
s"after
HOKimball
ou was iiuts
the time allew-
Sections 27,42.
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The legislative branch in this respect acts as the last
authority of appeal after other statutory rights have been
111
utilized. This applies part icularily to requests for recounts
for which there are statutory provisions for election officials
112
to make the necessary recounts. The General Court disliked to
have to act in the capacity of merely counting votes, since the
seat of a member should not be challenged when it is only a
question of computation the legislature admitted:
That the committee cannot show themselves
likely to be more fair, more careful,
or more impartial in coming to their
conclusions, than was the board charged
by law with determining the result. 113
However, this principle was upheld in 1935 in the Cahill
vs. Moys e case but it was not followed because it was labelled
as a "technical obstruction" in the same year,
1
!^ Willis vs.
MeElroy . Thus some committees refuse to grant recounts unless
the majority is affected whereas other committees will grant
a recount on the slightest provocation.
After a brief consideration of how some of the questions
which have confronted the General Court have been handled, it
is evident that the General Court has been inconsistent, arbi-
trary, and undistinguished in the treatment of these election
problems. That the legislature does not exercise its power to
meet the electi on problems before it also is apparent.
Ill Moore vs. Booth 1910.
11
assachusetts Acts of 1907, Chapter 560, Section 300.
113McGibbons vs. Walden 1877.
114
Cahill vs. Moyse 1935 and Willis vs. McElroy 1935,
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CHAPTER VI
THE MORE OF PROCEDURE
1 . How Case? ^re Heard :
When the legislature decides a case it bases its decision
upon the pertinent statute and uoon precedent. However, when
the legislature looks for rules of procedure to guide it in
orocessing the cases it finds no statutory basis. In other
words, it is governed by precedent pure and simole. This reliance
uoon an indefinite tradition or unwritten law can result in arbi-
trary and capricious action which frenuently injures parties in-
volved in the election disputes. As far as can be determined the
Procedure is based on legislative precedent but without any
statutory basis. In other words, the legislature has made no
organic law covering rules of o'rocedure, but simply makes up
the rules in an arbitrary fashion as it goes along.
Consideration will be now focused on the nature of the
proceeding by which these cases are presented to the General
Court. The mode of procedure of hearing these election cases
is determined by the General Court itself as part of its power
over elections. The manner by which these oases are heard is
another indication of how the legislature exercises its power
over elections. The rules of procedure in election cases for
how these cases are to be heard, the method of initiating a

case, the form of Petitions, rules of evidence, and the burden
of proof are all determined by precedent and illustrates how
well the legislature exercises its judicial function.
Our present framework of procedure for contested elections
in the General Court is virtually the same as it has been since
the committee method was adopted in 1794. It was a result of
the same struggle between the crown and Commons in the 17th
century in the days when the courts were "agents for the Crown.
The procedure that was originated in the "mother of parliaments
has been abandoned by the British. However, Massachusetts has
used the same procedure of hearing election cases since 1794,
The methods of hearing these cases in Massachusetts have
been of two general types. The first was the old method of
hearing the case before the bar of the house itself, which was
used in the Commonwealth until 1794. This system wasted many
days of legislation in orally arguing these election cases and
often consumed long periods of time when the ooen debate fre-
quently became too heated. The second method of hearing cases,
and the method that is still used, is that of having the com-
mittee of the house hear cases and then present its report to
the full house who would vote on t he case. The committees sene
, ,
*
,
„
briefs of the case to the full house, but the house does not
hear the full evidence and are, therefore, voting to approve
or disapprove the committee reports."*’ Many of the committee
reports contain dissents, just as in judicial decisions where
there are the majority and minority reports. The general rule
is to have the house decide cases based on the facts presented
to it in the form of committee reports. A House resolution in
1811 stated that all extraneous matter was to be excluded from
the committee reports and that the "facts stated by the commit-
tee on elections shall be considered as the only basis" upon
which the house would decide the case. 2
2. The Committee System :
Thus, what the house hears is not the full evidence but a
report. There is always the problem in dealing with committee
reports that the awareness that they have to report to the full
^•Luther S. Cushing, Charles W.Storey, and lewis Josselyn,
Reports of Controverted Elections 1780-1852 (Boston: White and
Potter, 1853), Introduction. Hereafter cases will be cited
only by name and year since they are listed chronologically in
the Appendix and in the following volumes: Prom 1780 to 1851
in Cushing cited above, from 1852 to 1885 in Edward P. Loring
and Charles T.Russell, Reports of Controverted Elections
(Boston: Wright and Potter, 1886T. Prom 1886 to 1902 in
Charles T. Russell, Reports of Contested Election Ca^es (Boston;
Wright and Potter, 1902) . "From 1903 to 1922 in Andrew A.Cassssa
Reports of Contested Election Cases (Boston: Wright and Potter,
1922) . From 1923 to 1942 in Paul I). Howard, Reports of Con-
tested Election Cases (Boston: Wright and Potter, 194FF.
Cushing, ^op. §it., "Rules Concerning Controverted Elections
Pebruary ,1811
,
pp. H&-117.
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legislative body tends to inspire a scrupuLous attempt to dem-
onstrate how the ’’committee decision comports with public
'Z
interest.” This interest in the public welfare strangely
enough is manifested in both the majority and minority reports,
and invariably the "public interest” and "will of the people
must be supreme" concepts appear most strongly in the cases
that differ from previous precedents or depart from the legal
4
requirements. The following statement appears in essence in
almost every case that involves a sharp dissent:
In regard to those facts, there is little
if any difference of opinion in the minds
of the committee; but upon some points of
law applying to those facts, and upon some
conclusions to be drawn from them, they are
not so happily agreed. 5
The instructions to the committee on elections that "com-
mittees of the house should report the return of all papers
£
with their reports" have not been followed. Many of the re-
ports do not even contain a sufficient statement of facts or a
clear statement as to the nature of the case.
3 Joseph P. Chamberlain, Legislative Processes* National and
and State
. ( New York; Macmillan Company, 19^6), p. 79.
4 Hinks vs. Jones 1856.
5 Mansfield vs. Hitchings 1886, Shepard vs. Sears 1890,
Andrews vs. Cordon 1900. and Cahill vs. Moyse 1935.
6 Belchertown 1810.
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Another interesting aspect of the committee system is that
their decisions are not binding. When the committee was first
in operation, men of outstanding legal knowledge were appointed
to these committees fot the purpose of making the best decisions
according to law and to the facts in the case. As Edward P.
Loring and Charles T. Russell, Jr. have observed of committees
in their preface to the thorough editorship of election eases,
the work of the committee of elections is judicial rather
than political-- dealing with vested rights, and deciding what
in law and fact the people have done in the exercise of their
right of election.
Membership to election committees was considered a post of
honor. However, today, appointments are automatically reserved
for the newest members of the General Court as an assigned task
on the basis of party affiliation. The indifference of the
members of the committee is reflected in the undistinguished
handling of election eases.
The mention of ’’political decision" as not being common,
because of a single party predominance during that period in the
General Court, does not free us from the possibility of a de-
liberately selected bi-partisan committee. Indeed, bi-partisan
committees generally indicate that they do stand by their par-
ties. The numerous dissenting opinions do not represent for
7
Milton 1812, Stimpson vs. Breed 1876.
gLoring and Russell, op . cit
.
, pp. VI, VII.
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the most part a difference of facts but rather the "legal" inter
q
pretation. A further indication that either the committee
reports or the house vote on election matters is not too im-
partial is the fact that more than ten percent of these cases
resulted in a rejection by the full house vote. In theory, the
legislative claim to just and impartial decisions is somewhat
puzzling when "no action" or an outright rejection is made in
numerous cases.
^
The impartiality of the decisions is question-
ed by the fact that so many are overruled by a full house vote
of the legislature who have not themselves heard the full
evidence. This, indeed, adds a new twist to legislative just-
ice that sets it apart from the general concept of justice.
Joseph Chamberlain in his brilliant writings on the nature of
the legislature offers a helpful suggestion to the understand-
11ing of the practical operation of committees. He states
that in the bi-partisan organization of the oommittees (which
is basic in the American development of the law making process^
the dominant party has sufficient control to secure the passage
of any bill which it is able to make a party measure.
Another interesting development in legislative justice was
first expressed ih 1844 that not only can a decision be reject-
ed, but it can also be "recommitted for reconsideration and the
former decision reversed" even after an elapse of time. There
aarnett, jop. cit
.
, p. 149.
10Injrra, Appendix. Hereafter all election cases cited are
listed in Appendix.
, ^
__ __
' **--*-*-
-- pp. 53-54.
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has been a growing tendency since this principle was expressed
to reconsider decisions in open debate on the floor* This
ability to reopen settled cases has caused many committee reports
to be rejected,
3. Method of Initiating Cases :
The mechanics of initiating a contested election case in
Massachusetts are of three general sources. First, an inquiry
into the right of a sitting member may be made by a motion of
some member of the legislature, '’declaring that he stands ready
to prove the disqualifications. ^ Secondly eases may arise
from investigations of returns prompted by any pertinent ques-
14
tion initiated by action in a similar case. Thirdly, cases
may be initiated by the petition of an interested party. This
third group is, of oourse, the manner in which almost all of the
oases are introduced. These principles were established in
early cases.
4. Form of Petition :
The petitions required to initiate the case have certain
specifications. Anyone may submit a petition stating the
grounds and the facts as to why the election should be contro-
verted. Petitioners must offer evidence, or if they do not
^Webster 1844.
13Hopkinton 1783.
14
Truro 1781, Lanesborough and New Ashford 1811, Case of
Moses Fearing 1819, and Attleborough 1828.
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intend to offer any supporting materials to their petition,
they, the petitioners, will automatically have "leave to with-
draw their petition i" 1 ^ this requirement established the burden
of proof on the petitioner, and no claims are considered if
evidence is not offered. If petitioners do not present request-
ed information and evidence to the legislature "after due notice,
16then they will be deemed to have abandoned the petition."
All petitions "must be seasonably brought forth" and con-
siderations of cases will not be made if the petition is late. 1
’
5
'
The rule set down in 1811 was that "no petitions would be
received after the first session." Petitions may be with-
drawn if the petitioners "can arrive at an understanding be-
tween the parties." 19
The form of the petition is not very strict, and anyone
can allege the ineligibility of the sitting member"although
the contestant is hi&self ineligible to office," since the
ousting of the sitting member does not mean that the petition-
20
er has a claim to the seat. The petition does not have to
contain all the statement of facts because new evidence can be
^Northampton 1840.
16Williamst own 1844, South Hadley 1844.
17Sutton 1810, Sharon, 1843.
18CushingVLtto^f p. 116.
19
Case of Sliphalet P. Hartshon 1840.
^Jenkins vs. Shaw 1876 and Claflin vs. Wood 1881.
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considered later; the petition itself can be amended to correct
faulty construction. This has been the general procedure, and
evidence of irregularity not expressly alleged in the petition
21
has been allowed. However, there have been varied exceptions
to this general rule. In one petition, which alleges ineligi-
bility due to residence, all evidence of informal and illegal
proceedings was not admitted although it might have changed
22
the results of the election.
In the Sharon case the petitioner claimed that the polls
were not open two hours, but it was not considered by the com-
mittee "inasmuch as these allegations were not set forth in
the petition, nor contained in the specifications.” Cushing
has stated the rule:
"The committee can consider and report only
the allegations in the petition and the spec-
ification thereunder." 24
However, other cases rule that the petition need not be
so formally interpreted and that evidence not in the petition
may be introduced. These cases seem to be the present proce-
dure. But it is possible for other legislatures to return to
a strict conformity of the petition, or they may continue to
21Stimpson vs. Breed 1876, Jenks vs. Hayes 1853.
??
Hinks vs. Jones 1856, Hew Marborough 1836.
2 ^
Sharon 1843.
24Cushing, Law and Practice
.
ojd. cit
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allow faulty petitions to be valid depending upon the disposi-
tion of each legislature. There have been instances where in-
formal petitions have been accepted, and other cases where there
has been the strict insistence upon a correct petition. There-
fore, the mode of procedure varies in the very first step of the
proceedings
•
5. Rules of Evidence:
The rules of evidence can determine to a large extent the
degree of justice in election cases. It is the general practice
to adopt the entire rules of procedure from the preceding house,
25
but departures have been common. Problems concerning the rules
of evidence generally deal with questions of: a. whether prima
facie evidence of the local election officials is valid, and
b. whether the voter’s dispositions as to how he voted are admis-
sible.
The old precedent of accepting the prima facie findings
of the election officials as valid and correct was stated in
the principle that it was "not the rule of the House to go
beyond returns" to settle election cases. The tendency was to
judge the case on the evidence of the election officials as con-
clusive and prima facie evidence, unless otherwise proven. How-
ever as election problems became more complicated the methods of
25fcIilton 1812.
^Belchertown 1810.
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ascertaining the results of an election required ’’the power to
27
go behind the ballot." More stress was given to investigat-
ing the findings of election officials. Experts and advisors
were required to aid in the study of election returns. The
time and cost involved in obtaining special help by the election
committees to consider evidence of election officials is im-
mense. The sum of five hundred dollars had to be paid to two
men assisting the election committee in considering the evidence
p o
of the election officials in the recent Fitzgerald case. °
The rules of evidence do not generally allow the voter’s
29
own statement for whom he voted "to be sufficient evidence".
In any case, the voter cannot be compelled to disclose for whom
30he voted since such evidence violates the secret ballot.
But even when such evidence is voluntarily given, the question
arises as to how valid such evidence is. Evidence as to how a
31
person voted was admitted as "competent" in some cases.
47Rioe vs Welch 1868, Sullivan vs. Allen 1897.
28Rosenfeld vs. Fitzgerald 1947, J ournal of the House
,
p.465.
^Dresden 1815.
30
Thomas M. Cooley, 0£. cit .
,
p. 605.
31
Rflmer vs. Howe 1870, Alexander vs. Doyle 1894.
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This agrees with the reasoning of McCrary that "it is competent
to resort to circumstantial evidence to raise a presumption" in
32
regard to how a voter claimed he voted. Cooley, however, ad-
vises that such "evidence voluntarily given upon such a question
33
will usually come from the least worthy of credit." * The
practice of accepting hearsay evidence from questionable sources
has been relied upon by the General Court to determine cases with
the qualification that "evidence for whom illegal votes were
cast will be admitted but given attention and proper weight."34
Cushing has stated that "the same general rules by which
eourts of law are governed in regard to evidence" should also
3*5
prevail in election cases. However, the legislative com-
mittees usually assert "strict rules of evidence are not ad-
hered to." 36
6. Burden of Proof:
The procedure concerning proof is threefold in cases of
fraud where it is necessary to prove: a. Illegal votes were
cast, b. Fraud must be known to the candidate, and c. Fraud
37
must affect the result of the election. The third aspect has
32George W. McCrary, op . cit .
,
p. 363.
33Thomas M. Cooley
,
0£, cit .
,
p. 627.
34
35
36
37
Alexander vs. Boyle 1894.
Luther S. Cushing, Law and Practioe , op . cit .
,
Section 2.
Gilmartin vs. BesChenes 1933.
Alexander vs. Boyle 1894, Bullock and Lattimore vs. Burke
bury 1871, and Prescott vs. Crossman 1877.

often been open to serious question. Some committees have held
that if any fraud was proven to have taken place then the entire
election ought to be voided even though the result itself was
not proven affected because it is possible to assume that more
fraud existed than it was actually possible to prove. They
reason that if confidence in an election is destroyed and com-
plete "purity of the ballot" is not protected, then the election
should be voided. Other committees have held that only those
elections in which fraud was proven to have affected the result
should be voided. They reason that if there was not sufficient
fraud to change the result, then the election must still be
considered a free election. Still others draw a finer line and
distinguish between illegal voting "as those not merely quali-
fied to vote" and faulty votes or fraudulent voting "as those
who use bribes, violence, or corrupt practices". Mr. Justice
Morton felt that "this is so plain a proposition, that it needs
38
no authority to support it," and that the majority must be
changed. The principle that a majority must be affected has a
long list of eases to support it,^9 but, as will be pointed out
later, the exceptions to this rule are also great.
The eminent authorities differ on the correct procedure
concerning the principle that the "majority must be affected."
^®First Parish etc. vs. Stearns, 21 Pick 148 ( 1838 ).
Charlemont 1829
,
Marblehead 1824
,
Ashfield 1850
,
Barr
petition 1875
,
Mansfield vs. Hitchens 1886 .
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McCrary supports this rule while not making a clear distinction
40
between "illegal” and "fraud."
McCrary states that even though, all faith in the reliabil
ity of an election is destroyed due to willful corruption, the
election may stand, although the return falls to the ground,
McCrary believed "it is not a valid objection to an election
that illegal votes were received, if they did not change the
majority."41
Cushing, on the other hand, does not give his approval io
this doctrine. He more firmly states his position that if
freedom of elections is in anyway violated by any corruption
"the election will be void without reference to the number of
votes affected.
The Barr case required the petitioner to prove not only
that the majority was affected but illegal "votes were cast
43
for the sitting members,"
The rule that the petitioner first had to avail himself
of all his statutory rights before the case would be heard by
40
McCrary, op. cit
.
, g. 363.
41loc . cit..
4 ?
^Cushing, Legislative Practice
,
op . cit
.
,
p. 68.
43
Barr, op. cit., 1875.
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the legislature was the general mode of procedure* The intent
of this principle is to limit the number of cases that came be-
fore the General Court by making certain that all other appeals
have been first made* It is similar in purpose to the princi-
ples concerning the presentation of petition and evidence so as
not to take up the time of the General Court with cases that
have no foundation. The legislative branch in this respect acts
as the last authority of appeal after other statutory rights
have been utilized, 44
With these brief considerations on some of the basic pro-
cedural rules, it is evident that the General Court has no fixed
procedure but rather adapts the proper procedure to the cir-
cumstances. The more basic procedural mechanics and forms appear
to be fairly constant but the operating principles behind the
mode of procedure vary considerably according to the needs as
does the attitude of the election committees. In the absence
of statutory regulations the house is free to determine its own
procedure, which can never be very definitely settled, since
"neither House is absolutely bound either by the action of any
previous House, or by the statute itself." 45
44Moore vs. Booth 1910.
45McCrary, oj). oit
.
,
pp. 323-333.
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CHAPTER VII
LR3IS1ASIVE POWER OVER THE LAW
1. Methods of Interpretation :
The legislative power over its own elections is both "
exclusive" and "absolute" as was oointed out in Chapter III.
This chanter will illustrate how the legislature can exoloit
its power which is neither limited by precedent nor by statu-
tory provisions of the election laws. This chapter describes
how this system of legislative justice can destroy the purpose
of any election law. an important difficulty that is evident
in allowing the state legislature to interpret the election laws
made by their own body is the fact that the statutes are readily
circumvented in election cases. The problem is that, if any law
is to be liberally interpreted in one case and strictly interpret-
ed in another, or if it is labelled "mandatory" in one case and
held to be only "directory" in another case, then the interpre
tation of the election laws would permit an election system in
which the popular will would be assured expression. However,
this "leaning to liberality" must be consistent and not aifcltr^-
ry; otherwise, the la..s do not have general applicability anu
become an instrument of political expediency. To claim that
the "voter's intention is above the law" is to allow the legis-
lative committee to theorize into invalidating any election law
or precedent. This "leaning to liberality," although it may serve
the public need if justly applied, has often been overdone in
several instances by the legislature. Indeed, if the laws are
^too^ "obsolet e," "wooden," or "technical," the remedy does not
lie in this method of arbitrary judgments by
:.
-
.
f
- - . :
,
t , ,
the legislatures with their exclusive election powers. The
use of abstractions, such as the ’’will of the peonle must
prevail” or that ’’technicalities cannot destroy the suffrage
of the people”^ had been frequently utilized to ignore the
specific requirements of the law. This Y^t "beeYt considered
in more detail earlfCY. ^ To claim this power of arbitrarily
determining when a law is '’mandatory or merely directory”
is to hold the entire system of election justice within
the hands of the legislature.
Another questionable method of intemretsfcion is
that of quoting legal authorities out of context. The
sources of authority most frequently quoted by legistative
committees are the works of Luther S. Cushing^ an d Thomas
M. Cooley.^ Cooley draws a ’’substance?’ qualification that
is often omitted by legislative committees when they
cite this eminent authority to allow a 'leaning toward lib-
erality.” Cooley states that where an election is rendered
irregular, whether the irregularity shall void it or not
must depend upon the effect the irregularity may have had
•^Johnson vs. Cole 1B58.
^Supra
,
Chapter V. .
^Luther S. Cushing, Parliamentary Law
,
Op . clt .
.
^Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Const itutional
Limitations, op.cit..
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In obstructing the complete expression of the popular will*
Codey regarded as directory only those provisions in which
the election statute did not specifically require that a
thing to be done "in the manner indicated . "5 Although
Cooley referred to factors in elections which did not
deprive a legal voter of his vote, or allowed a disqua-
lified voter, or cast uncertainty of fraud into the election,
h*s statement has been applied by many committees to justify
labelling basic election statutes as "merely directory".
The ’leaning toward liberality" had been spoiled by the
General Court to include corrupt practices, time and nlace
of election, and admission of illegal votes. The laws in
some instances have been so "liberally" interpreted to be
able to destroy all the force behind the law.
While infact the committees do tend to follow the
"decisions" of previous houses, they are not thereby
bound to do so. The committee may ignore any question of
law or precedent without regard to previous rulings.^ it
was held as early as 1812 that each house would make its
5Thomas M. Cooley, £p. clt .
,
pp. 617-619 .Cf.Tobey vs. King 1859,
Whitaker vs. Cummings 1883, Willis vs. MciSLroy 1935 for "loose"
interpretation and Stimpson vs. Breed 1876 for strictness.
George Hitchins 1838.
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own rules and orders In respect to election cases.
However, some committees quote authorities and pre-
cedents from previous house rules and orders. Precedents
have been quoted as far back as the British common law and
the Magna Charter.® But there is such a compendium of
contradictory decisions on basic election laws which, in
fact, allows the selection of a precedent that will agree
with whatever position the legislature itself may hold.
2. Attitudes of the Legislature ;
There are two prevailing attitudes expressed by
legislative committees which are highlighted by th®
contrast of majority and minority committee reoorts . The
first is that the methods of interpretat ion employed by
the legislature are arbitrary, a mockery of justice, and
must be improved. The second is that the ancient method
of legislative justice in contested election cases must
be ’’jealously shielded” because the legislature is best
suited to handle such cases.
That the legislature has neither the time nor the
ability to perform the vital function of inves t igat ing
^Milton 1812.
®Lanesborough and New Ashford 1814, Fairhaven 1843
v rjf. - r:e e Itimai tnioe ^tsvov.’o.M
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elections has been admitted by members of the legislative
committees. As early as 1810, the committees were already
complaining that "it would require all their time during the
present session to make a thorough invest igation." 9 jn
1812 four cases had to be referred to the next session be-
cause there was insufficient time to act on them, and, as a
result, no further action was ever taken on these cases.
Whenever the "committee of elections were ( sic ) already dis-
charged, the remonstrants requested leave to withdraw peti-
tion" so that no action was taken in this case.^ Ordinary
legislative business in those days occupied all the time a-
vailable and did not allow for the special handling which
many of these cases required. The legislature of today, with
its increased burdens and more involved and difficult pro-
blems to solve, would seem to have even less time to allow
for justice in election cases.
Several committees in their dissenting opinions have
deplored "loose" interpretation which would allow the election
laws to be ignored. A firm statement for strict adherence
to the law and a defense of fundamental legal principles was
m /33s
made. The Woburn case, which ruled that the oath of office
^Boston 1810, Sullivan vs. Allen 1897.
lOwrentham, Falmouth, Standish, Buxton 1812.
11
Adams and Norton 1833.
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was required by law, voided the election because the oath
was not administered. The committee declared that the leg-
islature should settle questions upon sound principles, in
order that its decisions may ’’hereafter be cited as a well-
established precedent.” Objecting to arbitrary use of its
power over the law, the committee reasoned:
If this provision was intended as a guard
to ensure the purity of an election, why
should it be withdrawn? In all cases,
this house has the oower, constitutionally,
to set aside the provisions of the law,
however positive, and admit the person re-
turned to a seat, even though every sta-
tutory provision was violated in his elec-
tion. Would it be wise to adopt such a
course? The answer cannot be otherwise
than in the negative. Neither reason nor
authority has been shown, to set aside this
solemn provision of the law. ^
This protest against setting the law aside was intended
by the committee in this case, to establish a orecedent for
a more legal -like interpretation of the election statutes.
Many of the committees considered the inconsistent aoplicaticn
of election laws a real danger to free elections which the
legislature was ordained to protect. Using the ’’good intent”
phrase to justify ’’accidental abuses” of election laws is
another common method to overlook the election laws. The
dissent in the Dartmouth case in 1843 protested this loose
int«rpretation of the law because of ’’good intentions” as
defeating the purpose of the law and yet it remained
1 9
Woburn 1835#
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unheeded. It was feared by the minority report that allowing
such a loose interpretation of the law would enable other elec
tion officials with "bad intentions” to disfranchise half of
the citizens of the Commonwealth with perfect impunity:
It would be very dangerous for the house
to sanction the rule recommended . . . that the
good intentions of the selectmen should shield
their errors of Judgement from correction by
the house . 13
The ruling regarding the laws dealing with the procedure
of counting the votes was so loosely interpreted that some
committees felt it would encourage loose administration. Com-
mittees warned that to ignore legally fixed duties was to ooen
wide the door to fraud and corruption:
Unless each and all of these requisitions
are compiled with, the election is not ac-
cording to law. By wise salutory checks,
the laws of Massachusetts keep pure the
fountain-head of political power, and
they have been to our Commonwealth a savior
of right with liberty. But let us once
adopt the principle upheld (of loose in-
terpretation) and we open wide the sluice-
gates for all sorts of abominations, cheating,
and corruptions in our elections. 14
^here were many protests by some committee members of
the difficulty for their committees to act in a Judicial
fashion concerning election disputes. The committee admitted
difficulty of a Judicial interpretstion of the laws having the
^Dartmouth 1843.
14Sunderland 1852
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necessary ’’candor and equanimity and freedom from party pre-
judice that will insure justice?
the legal abilities of the legislature have also been
doubted by their own members. The very fact that legislatures
turn, to the judiciary and the executive branches for legal
opinion is in itself an indication of an awareness of their
T A
shortcomings in legal expertness. Further case study of the
inconsistent and illogical decisions made by this body proves
more conclusively the legislative inaptitude for legal rea-
soning. Occasionally a committee welcomes the opportu-
nity to avoid legal questions and admit being ’’relieved from
1 *7
a question of some considerable emba pressmen
t
.
”
1
Robert Luce admitted the lack of legal abilities by the
committees to l y with the legal aspects of election
disputes. Luce, while serving on an election committee,
warned that the most conscientious legislator may find his
vision clouded by the mists of partisanship as well as lack of
legal knowledge. He states that on the questions of law:
Such questions are not most wisely handled
either by a legislative body itself or by
one of its so called committees. We are pre-
sumed to be qualified to make the law, but
the judicial branch of the Government i3 pre-
sumed to be better qualified to aody the law.
^Alexander vs . Doyle 1894.
^Cushing, Storey, and Josselyn, op. c_lt
. ,
p.52.
1VMilford 1851.
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History shows that of all tribunals, legislative
assemblies are the worst. 18
On the other hand, there are those who defend the right
of the legislature to be its own and exclusive judge of its
members. xhe legislature often exaggerates the privilege as
” judge of the returns, election and qualification of its own
members”^ by its firm statements of supremacy in such judicial
matters. In 1851 this reached a high point when the committee
stressed how competent the house was to settle legal points
without the aid of the court because:
...an opinion of the justices, in answer
to a question from the house, however de-
liberately given, and however responsive to the
question, is only the opinion' of so many able
lawyers, given too, without their having heard
arguments, and is in no respect law. It Is a
mere ’’opinion” and the undersigned deem It at
best questionable policy, on the Dart of the
house asking the question, to shift from its
own shoulders itself being the legitimate
expounder of the constitution, the burden of
making the exposition, ‘’he decision upon
this point blazing with their own singularity
and with the borrowed lustre of the opinions
of the justices, stand out like beacons in
the sea of law; but in the opinion of the
undersigned, it Is better to sail away from
them, than towards them. There are dangerous
rocks where they stand...
It is not supposed, that these cases
were intended as precedents, but that they
merely arose out of what was deemed a tempo-
rary expediency. . .20
*-®Robert Luce, Congressional Record 1921, Vol.61, Part 6,
p.6555, referring to election committees in general.
^Constitution of Massachusetts, Chapter 1, Section 3,
Article 10.
20Plympton 1851.
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These express ions of the legislature's attitude continue
throughout the cases and are often revealing since they set
the mode by which these cases are made to coincide with the
law. The same Committees have stressed the freedom which they
have in the performance of "such judicial functions as belong
to them." They are not bound to any rules of procedure "exceot
as they see fit." ^
Whenever the legislative committee has the inclination,
it may seek the advice of the at torney-general 22 or the
SuDrerne Judicial Court. 23 However, the committees may decide
24
any points of law as they choose without legal advice. The
judicial powers of the legislature are so extensive aid con-
clusive in election cases that any legal advice or ruling is
not binding. The legislative committee may hold opinions con-
trary to judicial decisions and may rule upon any legal ques-
tions involved in election cases without regard to: the rule
of law. One committee made its own rule on the law of domi-
cile because it felt that the court's rulings went "not entirely
,oc
in harmony with one another.
The legislature has "jealously shielded" its right to be
the "exclusive judge of its elections even to the point of
deriding the legal abilities of the justices. 2**
2
^Stlmpson vs. Breed 1876.
22Plympton 1815.
^°Dinan vs. Swig 1916, Boston 1810.
24Lanesborough and New Ashford 1814.
25
Jenkins vs. Shaw 1876.
26
Harvey vs. Bradbury 1920 *
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The state legislature has called itself "the court of last
appeal" with the power to inquire as minutely as it wishes
into elections and the "duty to inquire into every phase
upon which the petitioner adduces sufficient evidence to
justify such inquiry."'^'7
3 Effects of Arbitrary Justice
It has been pointed out above how the unsound methods
employed by the legislature have actually obstructed judi-
cious settlement of election cases. Observations have been
made of the attitudes of members of legislature. Some members
have "jealously shielded" and defended the ancient method
as an exclusive right. Others have admitted the weakness of
the present system and recommeiided a change. The effects of
arbitrary justice will now be considered.
The first cons iderat ion is how the meaning of law itself
is affronted. Robert Luce once offered a general definition
of the law which he did not consider comprehensive but felt
was basic to the essence of law:
Law is that which systematically
imoells conduct... The force must be
exerted with some degree of system and
it must tend to coerce. 28
Applying this generally accepted definition, it is
27Cahill vs Moyse 1935. of. Howard, op. cit .
,
p. 37.
' 28
/
' Robert Luce, Legislative Principles , op . cit . , p.3
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evident why the election laws of today do not have the ten-
dency to coerce. The lack of a sound system to use as guide
costs and precedents in election cases has voided the fo&c©
which election lav/s must have. Indeed, what is the puroose
of lav/ if it can be arbitrarily disregarded and given snecial
application to suit the interests of a particular legislature.
A
'hs method of disallowing the laws and the inconsistency of
decisions which is present throughout the entire period of
contested elections, has virtually undermined election juris-
prudence "more by analogy and according to their spirit, than
with technical strictness of the ordinary tribunals.” ^
If the legislatures do not apply the laws to themselves,
then they are placing themselves above the law because they
can name their own exceptions. Suspension of the lav/ must
be general and cannot be made for individual cases or for
particular localities. Cooley concludes somewhat awkwardly
that
:
A special statute that singles this case out
one to be regulated by a different law from
that which is applied In all similar cases
would not be legitimate legislation, but an
arbitrary mandate
,
unrecognized in free
government.
Since the General Court Is the chief pel ley-forming body
for the Commonwealth, these decisions are bound to be reflected
29Luther S. Cushing, Parliamentary Law, op. clt., p.76.
iO
Thomas M. Cooley, op. cit
.
,
p. 619.
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in the conduct of the people who actually adminis ter the
elections. There is the possibility that if the General
Court ignores the laws that this attitude will be reflected
by the selection of officials who will also interpret the elec-
tion laws loosely and will regard them as ’’merely directory.”
This factor has tended to encourage a loose adminis tration of
elections and has destroyed the tendency to coerce that our
laws should have.
It is amazing when the legislature decides to change the
’’liberal” rule and finds a ’’stringent” rule necessary.’ The
criterion ”as they see fit” varies extensively. It has re-
sulted in long floor debates and disagreement . Committees
have had their reports ignored or rejected because of the
•z pdifferences between the liberal and stringent intorore tatlons
.
&
This has happened In one out of every ten cases before the
legislature. The committees may debate issues of a case for
days and then only discover that the time they devoted to
reaching a decision has been overruled by the active House
vote
.
Since the Constitution makes each house absolutely and
Exclusively the judge of its own elections, any house may at
any time constitutionally disregard both law and precedent;
31Ashfield 1850.
32
Case of Thomas Nash, Jr. of Whately 1843, Calmer vs.
Howe 1850, Newell v». Coffin 1903.
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and the most
—
that can be said for the law3 regulating the
procedure is that they will not be disregarded ^without good
cause
.
33
Rammelkamp, op. cit
. ,
p. 427.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS
Legislative justice ended in the 19th Century, but the
practice of the legislature to be the 'judge of the qualif icaticn,
elections, and returns of its own members has remained as a
result of the historic struggle between the Crown and Parliament
during the Tudor and Stuart periods in England and during our
early Colonial history between the Royal Governors and the
assemblies. The purpose of granting this privilege was to pre-
vent encroachment on the legislature by the executive branches
of government and to protect the integrity of the legislature.
However, this practice has now outgrown its usefulness and has
been abused by partisan interests. When this practice became
so abused in England due to political party interests in these
election cases, the system was abandoned so that the election
problem could be more effectively and efficiently dealt with.
The English legislature gave up this privilege without
suffering a single indignity and without any loss of legislative
freedom. At present, our legislative privilege is operating
without its original purpose behind it and is actually working
to undermine rather than to protect the election system. The
early need for this privilege has passed with changing condition
and the new election problems require more expert and undivided
attention.
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The original purpose for granting the power of legis-
lative assemblies to judge the elections of its cw n members
was to protect weak legislatures from executive packing of
the assemblies. Since this situation no longer exists, the
legislatures have lost interest in the exercise of this power.
It is no longer exercised to its full extent and no longer is
the great importance attached to the election power as was
the case when the very freedom of legislative assemblies de-
pended on this power. It may be stated that the power to
judge the elections of its own members is no longer as vital
to legislative assemblies as it was when it was originally
granted for the purpose of ensuring the freedom of the legis-
lature from controlled membership by the executive branch.
As a result the power is rapidly falling into disuse. The
legislature no longer devotes as much attention to this power.
The election committee is no longer a key office in legis-
lative assemblies as it was originally. Appointments to that
committee are no longer reserved to the outstanding men of
legal ability but have declined to a position to be automati-
cally filled by newer members of the legislature. Cases are
few in number today and do not contain the important issues
as was the case when the power was first exercised. The
function has been reduced to memento of a once vastly funda-
mental issue to ensure the freedom of legislative assemblies.
The legislature no longer regards this power as essential to
its freedom today and as a result has tended to exercise it
»•
.
,
,
»
,
»
more casually.
Although the Supreme Court has declared that this power
is "absolute and exclusive"', the legislature itself has attach
ed less importance to the exercise of this power. The legis-
lature upon occasion has recognized its own inadequacies in
handling election cases. There is a tendency to, consider the
establishment of some system better fitted to deal with elec-
tion problems to be made under the provision which grants the
power to judge the election of its own members itself or n ‘ 'in
such other way as they respectively think best." Members of
the legislatures themselves recognizing how this power has
been exercised with apathy, have recommended that it be dele-
gated to some body which could effectively decide both the
legal and administrative questions involved in election cases.
The legislature is willing to admit upon occasion that it
lacks the necessary time and legal knowledge to adequately
handle this power.
The main consideration is that this power over elections
has not been exercised worthily because each major problem
before the General Court has been settled in an inconsistent
and arbitrary manner.
The problems of election procedure, qualifications of
office-holder and of voter, and questions of counting votes
have all indicated capricious settlement rather than a body
/
of sound legal like precedent which would encourage a system
of election jurisprudence. .Editors have compiled this case
hit, a? Miss: 57rr"
X
-
-
material with the hopes that these volumes of reports of contest-
ed election might aid the legislature exercise its power with
"accuracy in business, economy of time, order, uniformity, and
impartiality." The methods employed in legislative adjudica-
tion of election have not sustained the hopes of these editors*
Election cases although fewer in number, continue to be decided
according to the inclination of a particular legislature rather
than according to either previous precedents oar to the specific
provisions of the election laws.
The type of cases before the General Court reveals an in-
teresting shift from the period when this power was exercised
chiefly to judge the qualifications of the sitting members,
to mors recent times, when the main problems before the legis-
lature are concerned with the administrative questions of how
to conduct an election and how to count the ballots properly.
Regardless of what the type of problem was, there has been a
set of contradictory rulings by the legislature. The type of
case does not appear to make any difference as to how well the
legislature exercises its function since whether the question
before the legislature is that of compatibility of office or
that of how to count ballots, there are precedents which are
contradictory.
Indeed, the fundamental principles behind the mode of
^
’Supra
3 p. 4
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the procedure have varied to such a considerable degree as to
obstruct rather than aid a judicious settlement of election
disputes. These cases offer little in the way of guide posts
because they follow very little uniformity and do not respect
precedents involved. Special application of the laws has not
made for equitable settlement of these election disputes and
has not encouraged efficient administration. There is no uni-
formity in handling these cases or in consideration of rules
3
of evidence.
The possibility of a body as large as the General Court
trying to act in a judicial manner and attempting to settle
legal disputes by a mass vote makes election justice an empty
mockery. The group that is elected on a partisan basis cannot
be expected to be entirely free from personal as well as parti
san pressures which tend to make for political expediency
rather than legal impartiality. These pressures find expres-
sion in legislative justice when election principles and laws
are ignored in particular cases but arbitrarily applied in
others. To be able to set any law aside as "directory" for a
specific case is to defeat the meaning of law.
The defects of legislative adjudication can be seen in
the process of deciding these contested election oases. Th&t
the legislature has neither the legal equipment nor the time
to deal adequately with such cases has been admitted by their
own body and is proven by the types of decisions rendered in
these cases. The vast amount of time and expense as well as

legal knowledge that is required to settle these problems makes
this function a full time job, and it is understandable why an
over-burdened legislature cannot properly deal with the details
of such specific administrative matters as election regulations.
The very size of the legislature renders it incapable of
the maximum efficiency required. Its time is devoted to other
broader functions of policy making, as it should be. These
important judioial duties are not the main purpose of the legis-
lature, and as such, are treated in a secondary fashion to the
law making power. However, the problem of elections is large
enough and certainly fundamental enough to warrant firsthand
attention by experts in election laws and administration.
Election problems are not of the nature that can be satis-
fied by a spasmodic and unsystematic application of the law.
The problem requires constant study, since many of the malprac-
tices that exist in the election system are of a very old origin.
To allow laxness in election administration because the legis-
lative must retain to the ’’antient" and historic power exclu-
sively, when it cannot possibly cope with the election situa-
tion and cannot meet the need by its privilege of final adjudi-
cation, is indeed an abuse of sound government and an evasion
of a constitutional mandate.
The duties of election officials are to deal with the
qualification of the voters, notifying the time and place of
election, counting and declaring votes, and returning and
certifying elections. All these duties of the officials have

been allowed to continue in our election system without legal
prosecutions. To allow such neglect to go uninhibited is to
encburage such practice. The considerations must be faced
of what will happen to our democratic system if election
violations are allowed to run rampant. Our attitude on elec-
tions must be one of active vigilance against frauds and pro-
cedural ignorance which can defeat the purpose of free elec-
tions •
The poor administration of the election system can be
attributed to a large degree to types of decisions rendered
by the General Court. These decisions, are in fact, a de-
tailed expression of the legislative attitude toward election
administration. Surely, if "loose” construction and informali-
ties as well as outright violations of the election laws are
permitted by the General Court, they are very definitely
reflected by loose conduct by the election officials. These
types of decisions cannot inspire any mode of better adminis-
tration.
The General Court's attitude in these cases is negative
in that it lacks an administrative sense of how elections
should be managed. The General Court is passive in its
approach to irregular and fraudulent practices and are not
concerned with them "unless the result will be thereby
affected." The election system requires an active enforce-
ment of laws or a new code of laws that will apply, but the
General Court in these cases has done nothing but to provide
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1passive acceptance to violations of the laws. There have
been few active steps taken to prevent the elections from
being contested. The "either or" approach of "voiding" or
affirming elections allows a vast area of inaction which
allows gross irregularities and malpractices to continue
merely because it is not proven that the first result was not
affected. To follow this reasoning is to imply that no elec-
tion fraud exists unless the fraud is proven to change the
result of the election. The election officers who are guilty
of malpractices or profound procedural ignorance or neglect,
thereby go unchecked to commit more abuses of the system.
Certainly, this system of looking into elections needs a middle
road where such a vast number of cases are not allowed to go
without official action merely because the results are not
proven to be effected, which tacitly sanctions loose adminis-
tration of elections and does not truly fulfill the duty of
looking into the elections of its members. If the General
Court cannot look into all of the abases of election of its
members then it is only doing half a job of inquiring into
elections and ought to delegate an agency that will have the
time to manage elections in the manner in which they should be
administered with clock-like precision. Such an agency would
not wait for abuses to occur but would seek to prevent them.
Thus a pragmatic need for effective election controls is not
being met because of a historic and theoretic approach to the
problem which actually does more to hinder the integrity of the
legislature than it does to protect it.
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To depend on the legislature "exclusively” to make deci-
sions which they admittedly are not equipped to make, is to
force them into an embarrassing position and has proved not to
be an effective protection of elections. This important judi-
cial function stands along with the process of impeachment and
judicial review of claims against the Commonwealth, as the
chief exceotion to the separation of powers. Yet in the famous
I)inan vs. Swig case of 1916, attempts to establish an effec-
tive administration of the corrupt practice acts, were declar-
ed unconstitutional because "this absolute power cannot be
fettered" and because of a lack of the "entire separation of
the legislative and judicial department" as was interpreted as
being expressed in the constitution. Defending the "entire"
^ separation of powers when this judicial function is already an
exception to that doctrine, is indeed a parqdox. But the power
of the General Court to "determine all cases by committees of
their own members, or in such other ways as they may respective
S
ly think best," seems to still leave the way open to delegate
this power to a body more capable of dealing with election mal-
practices without requiring a constitutional amendment. The
meaning of separation was never intended to be absolute, but
legislative adjudication is deplored not on any theoretic
L.7 Supra
,
Chapter HI, Section 3.
^Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Chapt-
er I, Section III, Article XI.

grounds but rather on the pragmatic grounds that the legis-
lature is not best qualified to exercise that particular
function of government.
In summary, it may be concluded that the legislature has
neglected the exercise of its power over elections since it
no longer attaches the great importance to the power that it
did when the power was the main method of protecting the in-
tegrity of free legislative assemblies in the sixteenth cen-
tury.
The constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court
will not allow the delegation of this power even though there
has been expression from the legislative committees them-
selves seeking to find a body better suited to exercise this
function.
The very nature and number of the cases before the
General Court indicates that the election problems confront-
ing it requires a great deal of time and legal knowledge for
which the legislature is inadequate in the exercise of this
power.
The inability of the legislature to make judicial deci-
sions in the treatment of election cases is evident since the
legislature has been inconsistent, contradictory, and arbitr-
ary in the exercise of its power concerning some of the most
basic questions before it. The indiscriminate variations
between a "stringent^ and a "liberal" construction of the
.. 1
,
. r (' f
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election laws has been possible since the legislature is not
bound either by precedents of previous cases nor by the
provisions of the statute itself in the exercise of this
’’exclusive and absolute” power over elections
.
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APPENDIX
LIST OF CASES
EXPLANATORY NOTE:
The cape listings include the date of the case, the
reason for contesting the election, the result, and the
principles as they relate to this study. Many of these cases
do not contain important principles and are therefore not
noted in the Aopendix.
The symbol of the asterisk is used to indicate the
cases in which no action was taken or in which the committee
reports were rejected or changed by the full house vote.
The capital U represents unseated members*
The source for this listing of cases is the published
1
reports on contested elections from 1780 to 1942,
Sunra, Tables I, Charts I and II.
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YEAH CASE REASON RESULT PRINCIPLES
1 . 1780 Amherst-::* Unknown U
2. 1780 Perry, Member
from Easton
Conduct & Character
3. 1781 Cambridge Double Voting Ballot with two votes
cannot be severed and
counted twice.
1781 Vassalborough Character and Conduct
5 . 1781 Truro-::- Property qualification
6. 1782 Vassalboro ugh-::- Character & Conduct Inimical member to with-
draw until case can be
heard.
7. 1782 Hopkinton-::- Property qualification
8. 1782 Woburn Notice of Meeting Certificate is conclu-
sive evidence of notice.
9. 1783 Chesterfield Qualification of
voters
.
U Illegal votes allows
change in certificate.
10. 1783 Swans ey Character & conduct U Inimical member disqual-
ified.
11. 1783 Silas Fowler,
member of South-
wick
Character & conduct Seditous conduct is not
sufficient grounds of
expulsion.
12. 1783 John Williams,
Deerfield
Character & conduct U
13. 1783 Abiel Wood,
Powalborough
Character & conduct U Failure to appear before
house to ansv/er charges
cited as contempt
34 . 1783 Adams-::- Corporate rights of towns.
w?
15. 1781). J. Learned, -s:-
Oxford
Character & conduct
16. 1781). Kittery Character & Conduct Inimical intentions do
not disqualify.
i£ 1781+ Holliston Notice of
ing
Town Meet- Judged according to
custom and usage.
18. 1781). Mansfield-::- Corrupt practice
19. 1785 Dunstable Domicile
20. 1785 John Williams,
Deerfield
Character
*
& conduct Former exclusion does
not dissqualify him.
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YEAR CASE REASON RESULT
21. 1786 Paxton Parlimentary formali-
ties
22. 1786 Pembroke Property qualifications
?9 1786 Moses Harvey, Character & conduct U
Montagne
2b - 1786 Elbridge Gerry Domicile
25. 1787 Charlton Character & conduct
26. 1787 Middleborough Character & conduct
27. 1788 Hopkinton Parlimentary Formal-
ities
28. 1788 Gray Compatibility of
office
29. 1789 Christopher
Gore, Boston
Compatibility of
office
U
30. 1790 York Compatibility of
office
U
31. 1790 Danvers Notice of Meeting
.
CVJco 1790 Westminister Motion
33. 1791 Case of Brown Compatibility U
3b - 1791 Barnstable not given
M 1792 Shrewsbury not given
36. 179b Watertown*::- Corrupt practice
37. 1797 Waltham not given
\^b
PRINCIPLE*
Reconsidered second
election cannot invali-
date the first.
Burden of proof was on
the petitioners.
Removal from town does
not disqualify.
Confusion does not inva
lidate election. One
Ballot with same name
written twice will be
counted as one. When
election has been lega-
lly made it cannot be
superceded or invalidat
by another election of
the subsequent time.
Minister is elegible.
U. S. District Attorney
is incompatible,
U. S. Judge is incom-
patible.
Motion "not to send"
cannot be made after a
valid election.
U. S. Marshall is in-
compatible.
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00co 1799 Medfield not given
39 . 1800 Harwich Place of meeting U Change of meeting place
does void election.
l+o.
•s _/
1800 Case of Sullivan Compatibility of
office
1+1. 1800 Ludlow Conduct & character U Ten year old forgery
charge disqualifies.
1+2. 1802 Fryeburgh Conducting election
without list.
No list or investiga-
tion of voters does
not void the election.
1+3 . 1803 Topsham Motion Election held after
motion not so send
held valid.
kb - 1803 Paris Conducting election Inconvenient hour and
no list does not invali
date election.
1+5 * 1803 Sheffield & Mt.
Washington
Qualification of
voter
U
1+6. 1803 Case of J. Austin Compatibility U. S. Commisioner of
Bankrupts compatible.
1+7 . 180]+ Natick not given
1+8. 1805 Rehoboth-* Parliamentary
irregularities
1+9 . 1805 Danvers Ratable polls To be determined at the
time of any election.
50 . 1805 Bath-::- Counting votes Counting in private
does not void election.
51 . 1805 Franklin Notice of meeting Notice on the same day
is valid.
52 .
5f
1806 Sanford &
Alfred
Corrupt practice
Compatibility
Serving drinks does not
void election. Deputy
Post Master is compati-
ble.
1806 Troy Motion
51+
.
1806 Attleborough Qualification
voters
55 . 1806 Harvard-* Corporate right Town can elect one re-
presentative later.
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YEAR CASE HKiiS ON RESULT PRINCIPLES
1 .
,
56 . 1807 Tisbury Place of meeting
57 . 1807 Chelmsford Ratable polls
58 . 1807 Case of J. Waitex C onduc t
5£ 1808 Shelburne Property qualification
60. 1808 Westminister Ratable polls Proved by evidence of
city officials.
61. 1808 W. Springfield Ratable polls
62. 1809 Westonx Domicile of voter
63. 1809 Wrentham Counting votes U Whole number must ascer-
tained or election is
void.
61+. 1809 Hope Parliamentary
formality
Moderator can act for
Selectmen.
65 . 1809 Freetown Ratable Polls
66
. 1809 Bath Ratable polls
67. 1809 Dighton Ratable polls U Town fails to produce
list so it is assumed
polls are insufficient.
68
. 1809 Oxford Ratable polls Adjoining towns sharing
in the expense are to be
counted.
69. 1809
77
Medford, Petersham,
Harvard, Hingham,
Durham, Mendon,
Bradford, Charlton,
Boston Ratable polls
78. lolO Weston Domicile of voter Harvard student is still
a resident.
79 . 1810 Sutton Ratable polls Remonstants too late for
committee to ’convenient
ly' consider it.
£ 1810 Sudbury Ratable polls U
81
. 1810 Standish Time of meeting Delay does not void
election.
82. 1810 Raymond &
Easton
Ratable Polls Ass:; Assessor’s certificate
is evidence.
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YEAR CASE REaS OR RES ULT PRINCIPLED
f‘A3
83. 1810 Sheffield Corporate right
8lj_. 1810
•
Lanesborough &
New Ashford
1
Corporate right
85. 1810 Concord-x- Domicile of voters
86. 1810 Boston-x- Ratable polls
87. 1810 Gloucester Corporate right
88. 1811 Belchestown Ratable polls
89. 1811 Lanesborough &
New Ashford
Certificate of
election
90. 1811 Rehoboth Notice of meeting
91. 1811
103.
Ashby, Boston,
Bradford, Cam-
bridge, Canton,
Franklin, Hopkin-
Not given
ton, Malden, Milton,
Portland, Rochester,
Wiscasset, and Wran-
tham.
lOlj.. 1811
105. 1812
Middleborough Not given
North Brookfield Corrupt practice
U
U
U
U
U
106. 1812 York Notice of meeting U
U
Any separate corporate
town is entitled to
send one representative.
Mode of conducting the
election cannot town’s
right to send.
Aliens are ratable polls
since they are taxed.
Bonds cannot be issued
to pay the election ex-
pense because town might
be subject to foreign
influence or private
parties
.
Member unseated for not
furnishing the requested
evidence, "not the rule
of this house to go be-
yong returns."
Certificate must be
signed by majority of
selectmen or election
will be void.
Illegal conduct of pre-
siding selectmen invali-
dates election.
Fraudulent contrivance
to meet property qualifi
cations voids election.
Illegal notice of second
warrant invalidate elec-
tion.
Students not considered
ratable polls.
107. 1812 Westford Ratable polls
.©vldsdneEeiqe*! ©no fonee
an d ntrldonbnoo lo ©boM
, . :
-
slloq aldadBo: ana ansxIA
.bexsd a ‘is yorid ©onis
-xo noidoal© ©rid- \;sq od
dilgln nv/od ©i-usoacf ©enaq
nsiartol od do©(,djje acf
.
don 'xol bsdceannr iscbieM
©Inn arid don” t sonebiva
11
.eniJjJei gno^
acf denni ed.xolxidnaD
noidoale ‘to nandoalee
,
ml n
.
eonBvi'idnoo dnalnbirB*! 1 .
ll&vp ^d^sqo-iq dsec
-oela ©dB -.ilsvnl dfiBiisw
.nr in
. alloq aids dsn
drigl*! ©dB'ioqioO
diigli ©dBioqnoO
driyln ©denoqnoQ
io adBoi'lxd'ieO
gnidesm lo eoidoU
.•
10
.
bnoTriaA wall
1(
1
.
.
*•
.68
.
11
11
11
11
11
12
*
bnolrfsA w©H
x!on aft. 1181 .09
12 :
navi,
,
doll tnodeoS t difaA Il8l
-msO jbnolbB'iS
t
nodnfiO tegbl'id
dllM «nsbIeM tnod
~n£*iW bns t dee8S08lW
. : iXkld
.
. :
12
12i
121
aoidoxnq dqiroxcoD 126
1«
afcioY SI8I .do.
130
b'lo'idaeW Oil
132
!
«s M~
YEAR CaS E REaS ON
RESULT PRINCIPLES
108. 1812 Western Qualification of
voters
If sufficient number of
legal votes are rejected
or illegal votes receiv-
ed so as to affect the
results, the election
is void.
It® 1812 Milton Ratable polls U Insufficient for two
representatives thus
voids election for both.
Each House makes its
own rules
.
no. 1812 Dresden Notice of meeting u Election at one place
cannot be superceded by
another.
111. 1812 Woburn Ratable polls Paupers are not ratable.
112. 1812 Thomas town Ratable polls u
113. 1812 Randolph Ratable polls u
lilj.. 1812 Elliot Ratable polls
115.
' 123
1812 Cape Elizabeth,
Westfield, Andover,
Uxbridge, Lining
-
ton, Wrentham*,
Falmouth*, Standi sh*,
Buxton* Not given
12l|
.
1812 Sutton Ratable polls u
125. 1813 Roxbury Corporate rights u Vote to send cannot be
denied.
126. 1813 Elliot Conducting election Oath administered just
before election is valid
127. 1813 Charlestown Counting votes u Majority of votes cast
is necessary. When ma-
jority is unknown, elec-
tion is void.
128. 1813 Lynn Sc Lynn-
field.
Ratable polls People under contract
are ratable.
•CM1
—1 1813 Marblehead Ratable polls u People in the naval or
military service are not
ratable
.
130.
132.
1813 Sullivan,
Sanford,
Steuben
Not given
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YEAR CASE REASON RES ULT PRINCIPLES
133 . 1813 Case, D. Merrill Domicile U
134 . I81I4. Dighton Count uncertain U When count is uncertain
the election is void.
135 .
•
I81I4. Spencer Domicile of voter Residence, inhabitant
are the 3 ame.
136. I81I4. Nantucket Motion u Motion to send must be
submitted.
137 . 18 ll|. Dedham Property qual
.
Burden of proof with
petitioners
.
138 . I8ll|. Lanesborough &
New Ashford
Notice of meeting
139 . I8ll| Newbury Count u Uncertainty voids elec-
tion.
:
ilj.o. 181I4. Case, S. Aiken Compatibility u Army Chaplin is not
compatible.
li+i. 1815 Nantucket,
Sharon
Motion u Motion not to send is
valid and holds.
1I4.2
.
1815 Winslow Motion u Motion not to send standa
1)4-3. 1815 Dresden Qual. of voter
1414-. 1816 Falmouth Conduct Quashed indictment does
not disqualify.
1
145. 1816 Andover Count u When whole number cannot
be ascertained election
is void.
114.6. 1816 Gloucester Notice of meeting u Time implied from former
usage, insufficient.
147. 1816 Malden* Not given
1U8. 1817 Malden Notice of meeting Failure to publish a
voters list in itself
does nob invalidate el-
ection, although it is
required by statufe.
lli™ 1817 Asahial Stearns Compatibility of
office
u Professor at Harvard is
incompatible with repre-
sentative .
150 . 1817 Southridge Parlimentary formal-
ity-motion.
u Motion not to send stands
and election is void.
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RESULT PRINCIPLED
i5i. 1818 Boston Corporate rights
of sending
U Reasonable time must be
allowed by selectmen to
exercise proporate rights
of sending representative
or election will be void.
r# 1819 Charlestown Parlimentary Form-ality-motion u Must have sufficientdebate or election is
void.
•
U\•
—
1 1819 Moses S. Fearing Parlimentary Form-
ality-motion
u Motion not to send
stands
.
151+
.
1819 Randolph Not given
155. 1819 Fryeburg Not given
156. 1823 Hadley Ratable polls Motion to send may be
reconsidered while ele-
ctors are voting.
157. 182^ Marblehead Compatibility Incompatibility of U. S.
Deputy Collector of Cus-
toms—he resigned as
Deputy.
158. 1821+ Lynn Motion Motion to send can be
reconsidered name on
ballot to be counted for
eligible of 2 names, Jr.
is not part of a name.
159. I82I+ Chester* Formality of meeting Moderator to make certain
of doubtful votes, there-
fore adjournment on first
day was illegal.
l6o. 1825 John Shepley
Fitchburg
Domicile u Office holder disqualifi-
ed if moves from Common-
wealth.
l6l. 1825 Joseph Downe Jr.
Fitchburg
Qualifications of
office holder (re-
quire precept)
u Vagueness about qualifi-
cations (debated five
days )
.
162 . 1827 Barre Property qual.
16# 1827 Windsor Qualification ofvoter Withdrawal of unqualifiedvotes does not void elec-
tion.
161+ 1827 Case, Wm. Adams Compatibility u Office of Depdty Collect-
or not compatible.
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YEiiH CASE REaS OIT RESULT PRINCIPLES
165. 1828 Attleborough Certification
count
•
166. 1829 Berkley Qualification of
voter
Certification
167. 1829 Charlemont Count of vote
168. 1829 Pelham Not given
169. 1830 Ashburnham Motion
170. 1830 North Bridge-
water
Property qualifi-
cation
171 . 1830 Tyringham Count of vote
172 . 1830 Wm. B. Adams Count of vote
173 . 1831 Phillipston Reasonable poll
time
j
17U. 1832 East Bridge-
water
Motion
1 17^ 1832 Gill Motion
Votes for ineligibles
can be counted to make
up the total vote. Cer-
tificate must be signed
by a majority of select-
men, even if elected to
the office to be certifi-
ed.
One illegal vote does not
invalidate the election
where he received 92 out
of 132.
Motion in town meeting
not necessary to check
names of those voting.
Illegal votes which do
not change the election
result--does not void it.
Candidate must receive
majority of votes of
Electors. Each ballot
to be counted as one even
though only one vote ap-
pears .
12 to 20 minutes and un-
til all persons in the
meeting house having a
right to vote, voted.
Motion not to send repeal-
ed by another meeting and
second meeting held valid.
Second meeting to send
held valid.
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Y&iR CASE reason RESULT PRINCIPLES
176. 1832 Shrewsbury Count of vote Rejection of vote does
not invalidate election
unless effects the re-
sults. Name on the Bal-
lot is a "dropped vote
on the floor.
"
lift 1832 W. Springfield Motion U It is the moderator’s
duty to make vote certain
when in doubt.
178. 1832 Bridgewater Qualifications
of property
179. 1832 Lynn Conducting of
election
180. 1833 Lynnfield Qualification of
voter
Selectmen is not obliged
to allow any one to vote
who did not have name on
list.
181. 1833 Malden Ratable polls Ratable polls on day of
election determines num-
ber of representatives.
182. 1833 Adams Not given
183. 1833 Norton Not given
•
co1
—
1
18314- Marblehead Conducting Elec-
tions
Negligence of selectmen
to check names of those
voting does not invali-
date election.
185. 183I4. Holliston*- Conducting Elec-
tion
Law requiring voting list
does not effect election.
186. 183*4 Pepperell Not given
OO
-0
• 183*4- Mendon Not given
188. 1835 Orange Notice of meeting 7 days sufficient for
special occassions alth-
ough laws say llq days.
189.
ft
1835 Woburn Conducting Elec-
tion
U Selectmen must be previo-
usly sworn to duties or
election is void.
190. 1836 New Marlborough Unequal votes
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liSafi CASE RE^S ON RESULT PRINCIPLES
I
191 . 1836 Adams Parlimentary Form-
alities
U Meeting cannot be adjour-
ned without vote and
election' cannot be com-
pleted at the adjourned
meeting
.
1836 Adams ( 2 nd)-::- Motion When refused to be put
does not void election.
193 . 1837 Sandisfield Qualifications of
voters
19k- 1837 Hedford-::- Notice of meeting
195 . 1838 Emory Burpee,
of Sterling
Domicile of Represent-
ative
U
196 . 1838 Selectmen of
Sherburne Peti-
tioners
Notice of Candidates
Death
197 . 1838- Barre Double voting U
198 . 1838 Elbridge Fuller
Petitioner
Recording Not necessary to record
anything more than what
is declared by the sele-
ctmen to be a vote.
199 . 1838 Northbridge Qualifications of
voters
200. 1838 Malden Domicile of Office
holder
Validity of elections
must be judged by each
house and decisions not
binding? Committee re-
fuses to answer an abstr
act question so late in
session.
201. 1839 Essex Qualifications of
voters
202. 1839 Hubbardston Corrupt Practice Treating the voters does
not invalidate election
—
humorous quotes p. 38l{.-8f>
203 . l8l|_0 Mendon Certificate of elec-
•
tion.
20i|. 18J+0 Adams Time of open polls Itself is insufficient to
invalidate election.
205 . 181^.0 Northampton Conducting election
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YEAR CASE REASON RESULT PRINCIPLES
206. I8I4.O Wes thorough Check list List required by Law is
not used does not invali-
date election if no fraud
or rejection of legal
vote made.
20^ 181+0 Barnstable Compatibili ty-U. S.
5upt. Breakwater
Committee is not of the
opinion that this is a
U. S. office.
208. 131+0 West Boylston Motice of meeting
209. 181+0 Braintree Notice of Meeting U Where there is no law
must be a matter of "anc-
ient usage." Records of
to?/n meeting must stand
as true unless otherv/ise
proved fraudulant. Whole
number of votes must be
known or election is void.
210. 1824.0 Wilbrahm Count of votes U
211. I8I4.O Warwick Notice of meeting Less than 2 hours does
not invalidate election.
212. 1824.0 Upton Place of meeting Place of meeting can
change from original.
213. 181+0 Eliphilete
Hartshorn
Not given
2ll+. I8I4.O Wm. Brown Domicile of Office
Holder
215. 181+2 Blechertown Certification Three selectmen-- 1 inco-
rporated, 1 elected, lea-
ves only 1 to certify,
elected member himself
may sign.
216. 181+2 Princeton Conducting elec-
tion
U Vote to despense with
check list voids election
217. I8I4.2 Chatham Qualification of
voters
2185k 181+2 Tewsbury Town Records
219. 181+2 Methuen-::* Qualification of
voters
220. 181+2 P. J. Oliver Qualification
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YiiiiB CaSE REaS ON RES ULT PRINCIPLES
221 . I8I4.2 Coleraine Domicile
222. 181+3 Thomas Nash, Jr.
Whately
Count of votes All Ballots must be coun-
ted. Motion not to send
made after T, no choice'’
election should stand.
22$! 181+3 Rowley Time of polls Overturning baL lot box
does not invalidate elec-
tion if intent honest.
22 I4-. 181+3 Brooksfield Qualification of
voters
225. 181+3 Burlington Time Balloting after sunset is
void.
226 . 181+3 Dartmouth Qualification of
voter
Voter's testimony as to
residence is conclusive
unless proved otherwise.
227. 181+3 Easthampton Time Poll which is not open
2 hours is void.
228 . 181+3 Lanesborough-* Qualification of
voters
.
229. 181+3 Chelsea-* Motion U Election after motion to
dissolve has been declar-
ed, is void.
230. 181+3 Pairhaven Count Irregular
231. 181+3 Hawley Time u If polls not open 2 hour§
election void.
232. 181+3 Sharon Time Too late but objection
too late also-no action.
233. 181+3 Granby Conducting election u Made sans checking names
of voters on list is void
23I+. 181+3 Spencer Time May be reopened to allow
legal voters to vote.
235. 181+3 Erving Notice of meeting
23^ 181+3
239.
Chilmark, Bolton
Northborough,
Goshen
2l+0. 181+3 Lowell Not given Failure to appear for-
feits claim.
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YEAR CaSE REASON RES ULT PRINCIPLES
2)4.1 . I8I4.3 Milton Conducting-check list
2+2. I8I4J4. Clarksburg Notice of meeting If in customary form
election is valid.
2I4-3. I8I4J4- Coleraine
2/4?. 18144- Charlestown Time Ballot after sunset is
void.
2I4.5. iQhk Russell Time Petitioner did not appe-
ar, lose claim. Certif-
icate of Town Clerk is
not evidence of hov; long
poll was open. Although
poll not open 2 hours,
election holds.
2I4.0. 1814}. Sandwich Time U After sunset, void.
214.7. 18V4 Williams town Certificate Although alleged elected
after sunset, election
upheld
.
2i}.8 . 1814J4. Webster* Residence of voter U Rejected legal vote which
should have been, but
was not on list, voids
election.
249. 1814+ Fall River Time Poll kept open by vote
until after sunset, and
election not invalidated.
2£0. I8I4I4. South Hadley Failure to count
251. 181+6 Case of James
Freeman
Time It is proper to change
declaration of election
if a new vote is found
which changes the result
of the election. At hea-
ring the committee may
consider objections not
stated in petition.
252. 181+7 Dana Certificate
Time
Results not to be delayed
in public declaration.
Voting took place after
5> but committee gives
statufe "a more liberal
interpretation,” since
although balloting didn't
take place until after £
selectmen notified ball-
oting to be held before.
253. 1814.7 Case of Dan Hill Certificate
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2$k* 1824.8 Petersham Domicile
255 . 1824.8 Wllliamstown Domicile
256. I8I4.8
%
West Cambridge Motion U Person not legally elec-
ted has no power to re-
sign his seat.
257 . 1824-9 Somerset Counting Vote for ineligible can-
didate not to be counted.
When voter deposited
vote by mistake thinking
he was voting for some-
one else, his vote not
to be counted.
2^8. 18^0 Ashfield-* Double Voting
Qualification of
voters
.
Counting ballot with the
name twice as one vote.
259. 1850 Case of Wm.
Andrews of
Middletown
Domicile Changing residence of
representative is not
grounds for precept for
new election.
260. 1851 Sterling Motion
261. 1851 Hanover Informal notice
262. 1851 West Newbury Counting
263. 1851 Needham Conducting Custom in town not to
check names on list, up-
held.
26k. 1851 Georgetown Conducting u
265. 1851 Milford Ratable polls u Towns must elect capable
men or suffer consequen-
ces.
266. 18^1 Plympton-* Motion
Certificate
Motion not seasonably
made and even if so would
not void the election.
Certificate stands as
prima facie. If select-
men in error they should
be responsible, not the
town of Plympton.
267. 1852 Case of James
K. Fellows
Returns in error
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YEAR case REAS ON RESULT PRINCIPLES
268. 18^2 Case of John Town-Transcript of
send records
269. 1852 Plympton Conducting authorized
279 . 1852 North Chelsea Mot ion
Irregular count
U If motion discussed, vote
voids subsequent. Vote
cannot be counted unless
enclosed in a prescribed
envelope
.
271. 1852
272. 1852
Case of Holman
of Boston
Danvers
Domicile
Counting That all names were to
be on one ballot Is "mer-
ely directory."
273. 1852 Bolton* Counting
27I4-. 1852 Hopkinton Counting Unsealed ballots rejected
if counted, no person
would be elected.
275. 1852 Sunderland-* Counting
276. 1852 Chester Counting Custom in the town not to
have official counters.
277. 1852 Otis Motion U Refusing to put motion
not to send, voids elec-
tion.
278. 1852 Hull Conducting
279. 1853 Ordway V. Howe Domicile u Intent and fact must
coincide
280. 1853 Haws V. Darling Notice of meeting Motion not to send may be
waived by another motion.
281. 1853 In re Steere Domicile u If he ceases to inhabit
town he represents he
vacates seat.
282. 1853
*
Penniman v Prindle
Notice
Immaterial if not directed
that votes for representa-
tive should be on same
ballot.
283. 1856 Lynde Motion Motion not to send will
be binding upon the town.
281;. 1856 Hinks v Jones Domicile
counting of votes
u Votes for ineligible can-
didates (where knowledge
of such is unknown) will
be counted as blanks so
as to entitle candidate
with next high seat.
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285. 1856
286
. 1856
28
^
1856
288. 1858
289. 1858
290. 1858
291. 1858
292. 1859
293. 1859
29k- 1859
295. 1859
296. i860
297. i860
2'^ i860
Day v Taft
Johnson v Cole
Conducting elec
tions
Returns U
Martin v Brown Returns
Beck v Plummer Returns
Cummings v Cole Count
Taft v Cole Prescribed form U
Lothrop, petitioner
Newcomb v Holmes Conducting election
and returns
Tobey v King Notice and returns
Prince v Clark Double voting
In re John 0. A.
Griffin#
Knowlton v Rice Count
corft d
Bean v Tucker Counting votes
Domicile
Neglect in making returns
does not affect election.
Lav/ requiring returns to
be made to open meeting
is only directory.
According to intent.
Ballots not in prescribed
envelope void election.
The board has power to
apportion since it is
a legislative function.
Failure to use list does
not void election and
neither does unauthori-
zed alteration of returns;
Violation of time and
place and manner of mak-
ing returns does not
void election.
Burden of proof with
those who question cor-
rectness .
When one accepts an in-
compatible office seat
is vacant.
All votes to be counted.
If candidate is eligible
at time of election and
then after election
changes residence, he is
still eligible.
First count stands over
the recount.
Still a citizen of Weston
while in process of mov-
ing.
298. i860 Pierre v Brown
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YEAR GASS REAS ON RESULT PRINCIPLES
299 . 1864 Chapin Jr. v
Snow
/
Mistake in name
of voter
Jr. is no part of name
but is used as descrip-
tion.
300. 1865 Wright v Hooper Mistake in name of
candidate
U Misprinted ballots coun-
ted according to intent.
3 ( * 1866 Field v Wilder Domicile U
302. 1866 Coggswell v McNeil
Recount of votes
u
303 . 1866 Pease v Rowell-* Domicile u Act and intent must con-
cur.
30I).
.
1866 Thayer v Shaw Qualification of
voters
305. 1866 Bird v Merrick Notice Meeting can be served by
de facto constable.
306. 1867 Arnold v Champney Mistake in name of
idate
cand- Intention alone is the
criteria. Abreviations
are proved common under-
standing, not to be ad-
ministered strict letter
of law a fortiori. Ir-
regularities do not void
tie election if in good
faith.
307 . 1868 Rice Jr. v
Welch
Recount Legislature go behind
returns to ascertain re-
sults only in well found-
ed causes.
u>0 03 • 1868 Gilbert v Ingalls Eligibility of
senator (Domicile)
399 . 1868 Trask v McDuffee Improper Counting
310. 1868 Shaw v Abbott Domicile
311 . 187© In David S, Draper Domicile U Indefinite reply and thus
his seat was vacated.
312. 1870 Holmes v Haskell Count
31 1870 Palmer v Howe-* Qualifications of
voters
Evidence of how voted
admitted as evidence. I j*
regular or illegal conduct
cannot throw out the en-
tire election.
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311]-. 1871 Leland v Bird Returns More votes than register-
ed does not void election
in absence of evidende of
fraud.
315. 1871 King v Park-* Domicile
Qualifications
voters
of
316. 1871 Ordway v Woodbury Qualif icat ions
voters
of Illegal votes need not
be inquired into unless
they affect t he results
of election. Burden of
proof with contestant.
Mere fact there were more
votes than registered
does not affect election.
317. 1872 Stimson v BoardmanQualification
voters
of
318 . 1872 Burt v Babbitt Recount of votes Not to be unless fraud
or illegal procedure.
319. 1872 Harding v Pet Notice
320 . 1872 Davis v Murphy Conduction of
election
No recount can be made
unless authorized and
prima facie given to
those holding first. Ce-
rtificate. Evidence as
to how man voted may be
used? Time limit or re-
count of ballots must be 1
in order.
321 . 1872 Hobbs v Barthol-
mess
Counting
322 . 1873 Alfred French v
Bacon
Conducting Ex parte affidavits can-
not be used to indicate
who they voted for in
absence of fraud - 11dan-
gerous precedent. M
323. 1873
%
Austin v Sweet Recount Narrow plurality of 7
votes does not justify
recount
.
32k* 1873 Clark v Salmon Name on ballot
325. lQ7k Graues v Edson Recount
326 . 187U- Jenks v Hayes Petition must state
grounds
327 . I87I4. Anderson v
Tewksbury Domicile U
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YEaR CaSE REAS ON RESULT PRINCIPLES
328. I87I4. Lay v Pet Counting
329. I87I4- Perry v Mant ague-”- Returns
330. I87I4. Monroe v Cum- Recount of votes
mings-*
331* 1875 Thompson v Brit- Qualification of
ton-* office holder
332. 1875 McManus v Fair- Recount of votes
banks
333 . 1875 Greene v Bridge- Recount of votes
man
33^-* 1875 Hood v Potler Mistake in name
335* 1875 Shaw v Buckminster Recount
336. 1875 Maxwell v Vincent Recount of votes
337* 1875 Slate v Green Recount of votes
338. 1875 Taylor v Carney Recount of votes
339. 1875 Carr v Hawkes Recount of votes
3^-0* 1875 Quirk v McDonald Qualification and
citizenship
U Irregularities in returns
do not affect election
since' it would make a
dangerous precedent to
allow it to stand but
decision made on not
staking the whole vote.
Naturalization of sena-
tor’s father not consid-
ered legal by majority.
If candidate runs short
grounds for recount not
sufficient. Unauthoriz-
ed person aided in count
does not affect election.
Disposition of votes not
received.
U Where two elections have
been held due to tie,
the House upon pet. will
inquire into the first,
and declare the second
invalid. Counted accord-
ing to intent. Pencil
lines drawn over name -
void ballot no matter how
light. Recount should
have been made and second
election is void.
No objection at meeting,
no recount justified.
Selectmen’s duty to count
votes and close vote does
not justify recount.
Certificate of naturali-
zation by count is con-
sidered genuine.
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YEAR CiiSB REAS ON RESULT
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314.1 . 1875 Haskell v Classon Recount U
314.2. 1876 Keith v Mayhew Domicile
1876 Sampson v Water- Count of votes
man
3i]4 . 1876 Michael Barr v Returns
Pet
3i_l_^ . 1876 Stimpson v Breed Recount of votes
and certificate
3I4.6. 1876 Jenkins v Shar Domicile U
3I4.7. 1876 Bowker v Pet Count
3I4-8. 1877 Morse v Lonergan Recount of votes
3I4.9 * 1877 McGibbons v Recount of votes
Walden
350 * 1877 Merriam v Batch- Counting ballots
elder Domicile
351. 1877 Scribner v Keyes Recount Inhabitancy
of rep
.
Unauthorized recounts
void.
Pact of removal is of
little weight since in-
tent is important.
3
Returns are prima facie
correct and burden of
proof is with petitioner.
Changing original declar-
ation by official, when
finding more votes is
valid. Evidence that
mistakes were made in
count for city office
does not give ground for
recount of rep. votes.
Certificate void if not
made within prescribed
time, does not void ele-
ction when results can be
ascertained. Evidence of
irregularity not in peti-
tion will be heard.
No domicile sans resideno-
e, cannot have legal res-
idence for political pur-
poses.
New election will not be
declared while town has
2 out of 3 of its repres-'
entatives
.
Refused since scarcity
of ballot allows written
ballots in pencil.
Technically is insuffic-
ient and difference in
declaration or closeness
of vote does not justify
recount
.
If impartial counts made
by one ward and not veri-
fied by any others - in-
sufficient for recount.
. 3$2,
353.
slioimoCT weri^sM v rfdi ©2 . Suit
V r£'TB,S lesrio.
)%
355*
dV8l . <i|i£
0 j£C C J. L J 6 O D riB '3;6,
357.
.
358,
359,
360,
36l.
362.
rmoc9 » 84J
363,
3©3ov lo ctnuoo9H
3<i
YVS-t *Q4£
sIxoimoG
'
n9bl9
v;oaau Icfsrlnl ctauooeE
.
q©‘i Ilo
ae^eE v lentil'iog YV8^ . -£c£
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352. 1877 Haynes v Hillis Certificate
353. 1877 Prescott v Crossman
Recount of votes
Corrupt practice
Domici le
1877 Osborne v Hallinan Domicile
355* 1877 Hayden v Jenkins Domicile
'356. 1878 Clapp v Sherman Recount of votes
357. I878 O'Connor v Locke Recount of votes
358. 1878 Macomber v Fisher Counting
359. 1878 Kimball v Tilton Recount
360 . 1879 Mulchinock v
Jenkins
361 . 1879 Pope v Blake
Recount
Recount
362 . 1879
363. 1879
Bowker v Bond*::-
Filkins v Spill-
ane
Recount
Qualification
citizenship
36U. 1879 In re recount of Recount
votes in Westfield
1880 Hillman v
Flanders
Recount of votes
Qualification of
voters
Notice •
Certificate
Gross errors in city el-
ection does not justify
recount. Distribution
of checks redeemable in
liquor, cigars will not
void election, if they
do not influence unknown
to candidate.
Merely because alderman
differ in original count
in the absence of fraud.
Certificate is prima
facie case not to be put
in peril unless for a
good reason.
Granted when original
count differed - (bad
precedent
)
Granted without stating
reason.
Unauthorized recounts
illegal an outrage to
returned member and en-
titled to no weight.
Failure of clerks to
meet ascertain results
of elections the certi-
ficate and the election
results ascertained by
canvassing the vote.
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366 . 1880 Ames v Beebe
*
369 . 1880 Claflin v Wood
370, 1883 Whitaker v
Cummings
371. 1883 Allen v Crowley
372. 1883 McMahan v
McGeough
Recount of votes
Recount
Qualification of
voters
Domicile
Count
Qualification of
voters
Recount of votes U
Recount of votes
/
RESULT PRINCIPLE®
Refused because of irre-
,
gularities, in that it
would be impossible to
ascertain true result.
Names added and removed
from voting list illega-
lly, but member hold
seat. 3
Granted on grounds sealed
votes might have been
tampered with no proof.
Petitioners do not have
to bring the pet. for the
seat, pet by any person.
When first count elected
but final defeated pet.
by I4. votes probable error
in close justifies reco-
unt. Fact that a name is
on registered voters list
is not conclusive eviden-
ce that voter is qualifi-
ed and may be challenged.
Unofficial envelopes will
be counted although they
violate stat: Chap, 7>
sect. I4.. Naturalization
sans certificate should he
rejected. Qualification
of voters not on check
list has no right to vote.
Granted if separate coun-
tings not verified by all
officials
.
Count took 1 hour does
not justify and continued
mistakes in past sans
evidence and rule that
recount will not be made
on close vote.
Unsworn and unofficial
counters censurable but
does not justify recount.
373* 1883 Harris v Richard- Recount of votes
son
37^4-. 1883 Franklin Pease, Irregularity of Count
Pet.
367 . 1880 Geor v Cushing, Recount
pet.
368 . 1880 Grover v McIntosh Recount
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YEaR CASE RHiiS ON RESULT PRINCIPLES
375 . 1883 Wm. W. Foster,
Pet.
Recount of votes U Granted in tie vote >
where mistake in figures •
proved.
376 . 1881]. Baker v Hunt Recount of votes
Qualification of
voters
Granted if separate cou-
nting not verified. Re-
fusing a qual. voter
where his vote would have
changed the results,
voids election.
377 . 1885 Collins v Cogs-
well
Recount Refused absence of fraud
and proof without origi-
nal declaration changed
result in absence of
doubt and count made by
one selectmen but check-
ed by others.
378 . 1885 Splaine v
McGahey
Rec ount Voids election because
whole number differs and
irregularities made it
impossible to how result
was resolved.
379 . 1885 Chappelle v
Prince
Recount U Partly obliterated bal-
lot to be counted for
candidate intended.
•OCOCO 1886 Pack v Reed Recount of votes Refused unless probable
that result would be
changed.
381. 1886 Mansfield v
Hitchings
Qualification of
voter
Illegal votes does not
void election unless it
changes results.
382. 1886 Haskell v
Hopkins
Recount of votes
383. 1887 Carroll v
O’Connor
Recount
33ij.. 1889 Bond v Crowley Not given
385 .
•
1889 Howard v Neill Mistake in name No recount unless fraud
and error would change
result. Separate count-
ing does not justify
recount
.
386. 1890 Southwick v
Hart
Recount Imperfectly marked will
be counted if intention
of voter is ascertainabla
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387 . 1890 Shepard v
Sears
Rec ount As far as possible voters
intention should be given
effect.
388 . 1890 Jones v
Loring
Recount Marks not in the square
will be counted and so
will V and Y markings in
the absence of fraud.
389 . 1891 Bird v
Rideout
Recount Granted because of close
election-one vote.
390 . 1891 Doherty v
Haggerty
Marking the ballot Paster without cross not
to be counted.
•HOsCO 1893 Haigh v
McNally
Recounts of votes U Invalid when made by
unofficial counters and
not supervised by aider-
man and when certain
marks counted as votes
which were not so.
392. I89I1 Alexander et al
v Doyle, et al-::-
Qualification of
voters
Necessary to prove, a.
fraudulent votes were
cast and b. for whom
cast. Fraud or obliter-
ating in counting the
ballot will not void
election unless a. chang-
es result, b. election
cannot be defined, c. pe-
rson elected is envolved.
Evidence for whom illegal
votes were cast will be
admitted but given great
attention.
393. 1895 Adams v Moore Marking of Ballot
39l+. 1896 Morgan, Pet. Marking of Ballot
Bleiler, same
1897 Sullivan v
Allen
Marking of Ballot
Acts l893-*-3i*’ectory not
mandatory. When marking
of cross is doubtful it
will not be counted for
either
.
Place to make cross is
directory, not mandatory.
Intent not clear then can.
not be counted.
Power to go behind the
ballot-only on strong
proof of fraud or error.
Doubtful marking of the
ballot should not be cou-
nted.
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Y&ir Case REASON RESULT PRINCIPLES 7
396. 1900 Andrews v
Gardner
Marking of Ballot Whenever intention of
voter is ascertainable e
it should be counted.
Assistance to voter--
397. 1902 Maloney v
Stanley
although did not take
oath required by law— 1
election not void.
Recount of votes Granted to make a proper
decision in a tie.
396. 1902 Lawrence v
Foley
Recount of votes
399. 1903 Newell v
Coffin-::-
Recount of votes U Refused because of close-
ness and no fraud. Cha-
nge in one district can-
not be used to discredit
accuracy of the officials
in others. Formal defect
in petition should not
disallow recount.
J4.OO. 190l(. Riley v
Aldrice
Marking the Ballot U Lighter crosses in absen-
ce of evidence will be
counted. Intention of
the voter must prevail
therefore all sorts of
odd markings and misplac-
ed crosses will be
counted.
I4.OI. 1907 Lambert v
Forri stall
Recount of votes Recount made but no acti-
on taken on disputed bal-
lots since it would not
affect the election*
lj.02. 1910 Moore v
Booth
Recount of Votes U No recount "in a district
where petitioner has not
availed himself of his
statutory rights in res-
pect to a recount. Mark-
ing X in other boxes and
imperfect markings will
not be counted--since
difference must have some
significance
.
I4.O.5 . 1910 Dennett v
Sullivan
Marking of Ballot Marking in wrong place
will be counted. Granted
where close vote (one)
and proved irregular pro-
cedure recount will be
made
.
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RESULT PRINCIPLESYEAR CASE reason
Ar
ll-Oij.. 1912 Pratt v
Sargent
ko5 . 1912 Carlton v
Kiernan
1912 Clarkson v
Vinson
lj-07 . 1913 McGlue v
Fisher
I|_08. 191I4- Naphen v
Brennan
14 -09 . 1915 Whitney v
C obb-;:-
lj.10, 1920 Harvey v
Bradbury
Notice of Meeting
Not given
Domicile
Recount of Votes
Recount of Votes II
Recount of Votes
Marking of Ballots
Four instead of 7 days <
does not void election
e
although law requires 7 •
€
When returns and state-
ments are not made by the
registers to ascertain
result, recount granted.
Granted when there is a
tie of votes.
Pasters not in conformity,
with the law to be refus-
ed since if deposited
and not counted and voter;
is disfranchised.
lj.ll. 1921 Callahan v
Sweeney
Corrupt Practice
lj.12 . 1921 Bullock and Lati- Corrupt Practice
more and Driscoll
14-13 . 1923 Berger & Hayes Recount of Votes
v Ames & Symonds
I4.I4 . 1925 Wm. Madden Certificate
Misleading circular will
not void election in the
absence of proof that it
actually did mislead and'
influence voters.
Fraud to voicU election
must effect result and
be known and "ratified
by candidate." Circular
letter to negroes, illeg-
ally registered and warn-
ing them of fine for fal-
se registration does not
intimidate
.
Closeness no grounds-on
proof only. Registars
do not have to be sworn
to.
House to judge its own
members-exclusively with
the Great and General
Court, and no other auth-
ority has any power to
adjudicate upon this sub-
ject.
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las. 1929 Bradbury v
Sullivan-*
Corrupt Practice Circular letter with falsa
criticism without endorse-
ment of a single Voter
voids the election. False
returns on expended funds
warrants unseating.
la® 1933 Gilmartln v
Descheres
Recount of Votes U
ia7. 1935 Cahill v Moyse Recount of Votes Irregular voting list in
absence of fraud do not
void election. Powers of
senate in determining el-
ection case are plenary.
14.18. 1935 Clancy v Cole Recount of Votes 1
1+19. 1935 Warren v Daly-:;- Recount
Corrupt
of Votes
practice
•0CJ
-d 1935 Rounseville v
Hathaway
Recount
Marking
of Votes
Ballots
Found fraud in one distri-
ct-counted all.
1{21. 1935 Willis v
McElroy
Recount of Votes U Statutory provisions must
be interpreted to serve
freedom of choice no
technical obstruction.
•
CMCM
_d 1937 Nutting v
Stanton
Marking of Ballots
1I4-23. 19U1 Frank Morrison Nomination
h2k. 191+1 Capeless v
Condron
Recount of Votes
I
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